The Empirics of Agglomeration and Trade by Head, Keith & Mayer, Thierry
The Empirics of Agglomeration and Trade ∗
Keith Head† Thierry Mayer‡
June 23, 2003
Abstract
This chapter examines empirical strategies that have been or could be used to eval-
uate the importance of agglomeration and trade models. This theoretical approach,
widely known as “New Economic Geography” (NEG), emphasizes the interaction be-
tween transport costs and firm-level scale economies as a source of agglomeration.
NEG focuses on forward and backward trade linkages as causes of observed spatial
concentration of economic activity. We survey the existing literature, organizing the
papers we discuss under the rubric of five interesting and testable hypotheses that
emerge from NEG theory. We conclude the chapter with an overall assessment of the
empirical support for NEG and suggest some directions for future research.
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1 Introduction
In the 1990s, theorists developed a new approach to understanding why some regions
seem to attract a disproportionate share of economic activity. Widely known as “New Eco-
nomic Geography” (NEG), this approach emphasizes the interaction between trade costs
and firm-level scale economies as a source of agglomeration. The dictionary provides two
senses for the word agglomeration. The first is that of a process by which things come
together. The second is the description of a pattern, namely one in which economic activ-
ity is spatially concentrated. NEG starts with the observed pattern of agglomeration and
postulates a process through which it might have emerged: Producers and consumers co-
locating to exploit plant-level scale economies while minimizing trade costs. NEG there-
fore specifically focuses on trade linkages as causes of observed spatial concentration of
economic activity.
“New economic geography has come of age” as Peter Neary (2001) recently wrote in a
mildly skeptical review for the Journal of Economic Literature.1 While this statement seems
deserved for theory, the empirical literature treating the same questions remains unset-
tled in both methodology and results. There is no agreed upon regression to estimate, nor
even a consensus dependent variable to explain. As a result, empirical papers address-
ing various aspects of agglomeration and trade are difficult to compare. The Fujita et al.
(1999) and Baldwin et al. (2003) books devote a few paragraphs each to empirical work
and emphasize that the time has now come to devote greater research efforts to the em-
pirical validation or falsification of the framework. Overman et al. (2001) and Hanson
(2001) are early surveys of empirical work on NEG. Brakman et al. (2001) provide the first
textbook where many empirical aspects of NEG are covered in detail. Since those surveys
were written, the literature has continued to grow in many directions. Here we attempt
to weave together the disparate strands of the empirics of agglomeration and trade and
outline the important and challenging questions for future research.
The chapter starts with the definition and delimitation of the field in section 2, where
we organize the paper around five empirical propositions that we believe capture the es-
sential insights offered by the theory. Section 3 emphasizes the central role of market
potential in determining location patterns in those models and provides a method of mea-
surement directly derived from theory. Then, each of the remaining sections covers one of
the five empirical propositions identified in section 2. The empirical work on the impact
of market potential on factor prices and factor movements is covered in sections 4 and 5
respectively. The benefits that regions can enjoy from a large domestic demand (“home
market effects”) have been subjected to important empirical tests that we survey in sec-
tion 6. The impact of trade integration on the level of agglomeration is one of the most
sensitive questions of this field. We describe existing results and consider new ways to
test this proposition in section 7. The last proposition that has perhaps been most em-
blematic of NEG models because of its spectacular nature is the possibility of dispropor-
tionately strong effects of small, temporary shocks. “Spatial catastrophes,” where short-
lived shocks can have permanent impacts on location patterns, have been very recently
subject to empirical testing, which we cover in our section 8. We conclude the chapter
with an overall assessment of the empirical support for NEG and suggest some directions
for future research.
1There are now at least three monographs—Fujita et al. (1999), Fujita and Thisse (2002), and Baldwin et
al. (2003)—authored by combinations of leading theorists in the field that provide thorough analyses of the
theoretical aspects of the literature.
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2 Defining, Delimiting, and Testing the NEG
The label “new economic geography” is unfortunate in a number of respects. First, it
raises hackles by claiming as novel that which some already considered to be well-known,
but under-appreciated work. More importantly, the label gives no clear indication of the
contents. This means that the same label might be used to describe quite different areas
of inquiry. Finally, it is not clear what one should call later work that might supersede
the current approach. However, in linguistic choice as with location choice, there is of-
ten a gain from following the decisions of predecessors. We therefore adhere to common
usage in taking “new economic geography” (or NEG) to refer to theories that follow the
approach put forward in Krugman’s 1991 book (Krugman, 1991b) and, particularly his
Journal of Political Economy article (Krugman, 1991a). While we do not wish to denigrate
the contributions preceding and following these two pieces, their huge influence is an em-
pirical fact. AWeb of Science search shows that these two works received a combined total
of over 1000 journal citations since they were written.
Ottaviano and Thisse point out in their chapter of this Handbook that many of the
ingredients of new economic geography were developedmany decades before Krugman’s
(1991a) paper. Indeed they suggest that the main contribution of NEG was to “combine
old ingredients through a new recipe.” Krugman andmany of the other 1990s contributors
to NEG gave little acknowledgement to its antecedents in regional science and location
theory. Rather, they approached economic geography with perspectives developed from
“new trade” theory. Indeed, the concluding section of Krugman (1979) anticipates many
of the model elements and results that would appear over a decade later:
“...suppose that there are two regions of the kind we have been discussing
and that they have the same tastes and technologies. There is room for mutual
gains from trade, because the combined market would allow for both greater
variety of goods and a greater scale of production. The same gains could be ob-
tained without trade however, if the population of one region were to migrate
to the other. In this model, trade and growth in the labor force are essentially
equivalent. If there are impediments to trade, there will be an incentive for
workers to move to the region which already has the larger labor force. This
is clearest if we consider the extreme case where no trade in goods is possi-
ble but labor is perfectly mobile. Then the more populous region will offer
both a greater real wage and a greater variety of goods, inducing immigration.
In equilibrium, all workers will have concentrated in one region or the other.
Which region ends up with the population depends on initial conditions; in
the presence of increasing returns history matters.”
Krugman (1979), p. 478.
This quote shows that the main elements of the stories formalized in the 1990s eco-
nomic geography literature had already been anticipated by Krugman in the late 1970s.
Krugman certainly did not originate all the ideas currently associated with NEG. How-
ever, the approach he popularized drew heavily on his own earlier work on trade patterns.
2.1 Essential ingredients for NEG
Five essential ingredients distinguish NEG models from other approaches to understand-
ing the geography of economic activity. We do not wish to imply that they were novel
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contributions of NEG or new trade but rather that they are useful indicators for catego-
rization.
1. Increasing returns to scale (IRS) that are internal to the firm. NEG models assume a
fixed, indivisible amount of overhead required for each plant. NEG models do not
assume any pure technological externalities that would lead directly to external scale
economies.
2. Imperfect competition. With internal increasing returns, marginal costs are lower than
average costs. Hence, one cannot assume perfect competition because firms would
be unable to cover their costs. The vast majority of the literature goes on to assume
a particular market structure and accompanying functional forms for demand: Dixit
and Stiglitz’ (1977) model of monopolistic competition.2
3. Trade costs. The outputs and inputs used by firms are tradeable over distances but
only by incurring costs. These costs are often assumed to be proportional to the
value of the goods traded.
4. Endogenous firm locations. Firms enter and exit in response to profitability at each
possible location. The assumption of increasing returns implies that firms have an
incentive to select a single production site and serve most consumers at a distance.
If plant-level fixed costs were negligible, the firm would replicate itself everywhere
(a la McDonalds).
5. Endogenous location of demand. Expenditure in each region depends upon the location
of firms. Two mechanisms for the mobility of demand have been proposed.
(a) Mobile workers who consume where they work (Krugman, 1991a).
(b) Firms that require the outputs of their sector as intermediate inputs (Krugman
and Venables, 1995).
Ingredients 1–4 all appeared in the new trade literature, and in particular gave rise to
the home market effects identified in Krugman (1980). With these assumptions, agglomera-
tion can arise but only through the magnification of initial region size asymmetries. The
key innovation of NEG relative to new trade is assumption 5. Without 5, symmetric initial
conditions can be expected to lead to symmetric outcomes. With all five assumptions, ini-
tial symmetry can be broken and agglomerations can form through a process of circular
causation. This is perhaps the basis for the Davis blurb on the back of Fujita et al. (1999)
that, “the work is an even more radical departure from orthodoxy than the new trade
theory of the 1980s.”
2.2 Alternative explanations of agglomeration
If NEG comprisesmodels with these five ingredients, what are the competing explanations
of economic geography? Empirical work testing NEG-based hypotheses benefits from the
consideration of a set of plausible alternatives. Prominent alternatives to NEG include
2Recent work by Ottaviano et al. (2002) shows that a linear model of monopolistic competition retains
most of the key predictions obtained from the Dixit-Stiglitz structure. Results by Combes (1997), Head et al.
(2002), and Feenstra et al. (2001) suggest that NEG models could also rely on Cournot competition with free
entry.
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• Natural advantages (see Ellison and Glaeser, 1997, 1999)—also known as “First Na-
ture” (Krugman, 1993) and “locational fundamentals” (Davis andWeinstein, 2002)—
and the closely related “factor proportions theory” take the geographic distribution
of productive resources as exogenous and use it to explain the geographic distribu-
tion of production.
• Human capital externalities models link the return to skill in a location to the number
of skilled workers there. High skill areas tend to attract larger numbers of employ-
ers of skilled workers. Marshall (1920) describes this mechanism for agglomeration.
Formalmodels were developed by Krugman (1991b) andHelsley and Strange (1990).
Human capital externalities are central in Lucas’ (1988) theory of economic develop-
ment. Empirical applications are covered in the Moretti chapter of this Handbook.
• Technological externalities/Knowledge spillovers: Producers benefit from spatial proxim-
ity of their counterparts in the same industry via flows of productive knowledge.
The Rosenthal and Strange chapter of this Handbook considers the empirical evidence
in favour of each of these microfoundations for agglomeration. Our chapter, in contrast,
focuses its attention onwork that has a direct bearing on the validity of the NEG approach.
In any type of empirical testing of NEG predictions, we think an important issue is
that the researcher should keep in mind the presence of the alternative explanations out-
lined above. Ideally, the empirical procedures employed should incorporate one or more
discriminating hypotheses that can help differentiate NEG-type mechanisms from natural
advantages or “pure externalities” explanations for the level of agglomeration observed
in the data. Davis and Weinstein (1996), which we cover in detail, proposed a first empir-
ical test along this route, trying to discriminate between NEG and the explanatory frame-
work of traditional trade theory. While discrimination often proves difficult in this type
of modelling, we believe the literature would progress in an important way by following
this path, through the application of discriminating tests to a broader set of issues.
2.3 Testing NEG propositions
For guidance, we think it useful to refer to Leamer and Levinsohn’s (1995) influential
chapter on the empirical evidence on international trade theory. This chapter is known
by many empirical trade economists for its puzzling injunction to “Estimate, don’t test.”
Its more useful contribution is the process of laying out clear and compelling propositions
derived from theory that can be subjected to empirical scrutiny (i.e. tested).
Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) council empiricists to steer a middle road between “tak-
ing theory too seriously” and “treating theory too casually.” A related way to state the
problem is in terms of the classical statistical problems of Types I and II error. In doing
empirical work on NEG we want to avoid interpreting results as rejecting NEG when it
actually offers valuable insights. This might occur if our tests hinge on some highly fragile
aspect of the theory rather than its core empirical content. Conversely, we do not want to
confirm the validity of NEG based on results that are consistent with NEG but would also
be equally consistent with alternative theories.
Two examples illustrate these problems. In terms of “false confirmations” consider
the following quote from Baldwin et al. (2003): “Exhibit A is the concentration of eco-
nomic activity in the face of congestion costs. Two bedroom houses in Palo Alto California
routinely change hands for hundreds of thousands of dollars while houses in northern
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Wisconsin can be had for a song. Despite the high cost of living and office space, Silicon
Valley remains attractive to both firms and workers while economic activity in northern
Wisconsin languishes.” While high housing prices within agglomerations are consistent
with NEG they are also consistent with the three alternative theories of spatial variation
in economic activity. Indeed the natural advantages theory seems consistent with the facts
above. In particular, the superior climate in the San Francisco Bay Area (temperatures
averaging 49F (9.5C) degrees in January versus 14F (-10C) in Green Bay in Northern Wis-
consin) could push up housing prices and raise economic activity there.
False rejections can arise from the failure of the actual data to exhibit certain features
that models exhibit only as a consequence of simplifying assumptions rather than as a re-
sult of the fundamental mechanism the model proposes. For example, Krugman (1991a)
predicts that the distribution of manufacturing activity across regions will be either per-
fect symmetry or complete concentration in one region. Actual data for Europe or North
America show that all major regions contain somemanufacturing workers but they are far
from evenly distributed. Before we reject NEG based on this data, we should recognize
that models including all 5 of the identifying features of NEG are consistent with these
facts (Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002).
Our review of the empirics of agglomeration and trade is organized around 5 propo-
sitions that emerge from the most well-known NEG models. In some cases we include
alternative or subsidiary formulations of a given proposition.
1. Market potential raise local factor prices. A location whose access to major markets and
suppliers is not impeded by large trade costs will tend to reward its factors with
higher wages and land rentals.
2. Market potential induces factor inflows. Capital will be drawn to areas with good ac-
cess to major markets for final goods and major suppliers of intermediate inputs
(backward linkages). Workers favour locations with good access to suppliers of final
goods (forward linkages).
3. Home market/magnification effect (HME). Regions with large demand for increasing
returns industries account for an even larger share of their production. Put another
way, the larger of two regionswill be a net exporter to the smaller region in industries
characterized by plant-level increasing returns.
4. Trade induces agglomeration (TIA). In an industry featuring increasing returns and
partially mobile demand, a reduction in trade costs facilitates spatial concentration
of producers and consumers.
5. Shock sensitivity: A temporary shock to economic activity in a location can perma-
nently alter the pattern of agglomeration.
3 Preliminaries: Defining and Measuring Market Potential
The primary mechanisms at work in NEG are the market size effects first identified in
Krugman (1980). Krugman (1980) developed the basic model combining monopolistic
competition and trade costs. He then explored two implications, which we will refer to as
the “price” and “quantity” aspects of the market size effect.
5
The price effect emerges in a one sector model. If the resources employed in each coun-
try in each sector are fixed by full-employment and trade balance considerations, then the
zero profit condition implies that the smaller country must pay lower wages. Otherwise,
firms would prefer to locate in the large country and serve the small one through export-
ing.
Krugman (1980) illustrates the quantity effect in a very stylized setting involving equal-
sized countries, two industries, and “mirror-image” preferences. Helpman and Krugman
(1985) later provided a more satisfactory development of the quantity market size effect.
As with the price version, the country with the larger market is appealing because it allows
the producer to economize on trade costs. If wages do not rise to eliminate this advantage,
then a disproportionate share of the producers will locate in the large market. This result
is usually referred to as the “home market effect” or the “magnification effect.”
The rest of this section will proceed as follows. First we will show how trade costs
influence trade flows and introduce the critical parameter, φij, measuring accessability of
a given market i to imports from source j. Then we derive what might be thought of as the
fundamental equation of NEG: The relationship between the prospective profitability of a
location and its “real market potential.” Then we consider the effect of market potential
on factor prices and location decisions in subsequent sections.
3.1 Measuring access to markets
We employ the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model of monopolistic competition and trade in a
multi-region setting. Let µiYi denote expenditures by region i on the representative indus-
try. In theoretical models it is standard to make industry level expenditure be exogenous
by assuming an upper level utility function that is Cobb-Douglas with expenditure pa-
rameter µi, thus giving rise to fixed expenditure shares out of income, Yi. The sub-utility
is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of differentiated varieties produced
in the considered industry, with σ representing an inverse index of product differentia-
tion.3 In this model, σ plays several “roles,” being in particular an inverse measure of the
markup and available economies of scale. This parsimony is useful in theory but danger-
ous in applications.
The amount spent by consumers from region i for a representative variety produced in
region j is given by
pijqij =
p1−σij
∑k nkp
1−σ
ik
µiYi, (1)
where pij is the delivered price faced by consumers in i for products from j. It is the
product of the mill price pj and the ad valorem trade cost, τij, paid by consumers. Trade
costs include all transaction costs associated with moving goods across space and national
borders. We can see from (1) that trade costs influence demand more when there is a high
elasticity of substitution, σ. Indeed many results in Dixit-Stiglitz based models depend on
the term φij ≡ τ1−σij , that Baldwin et al. (2003) punningly refers to as the “phi-ness” of
trade.
3The taste for variety of each consumer represented by the CES functional form is not essential to the model,
as the same aggregate demand structure can be obtained with a model of variety of tasteswhen the variance of
consumer preferences is described by a logistic distribution (Anderson et al., 1992).
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The total value of imports (including trade costs) from all nj firms based in region j
will be denoted mij.
mij = njpijqij = njp1−σj φijµiYiP
σ−1
i , (2)
where Pi = (∑k nkp
1−σ
k φik)
1/(1−σ). Fujita et al. (1999) refer to Pi as the “price index” in
each location. It is a generalized mean of the delivered costs of all the suppliers to location
i that assigns increasing weight to sources that have a large number of suppliers, nk, or
good access to market i, measured by a high φik. Thus a location that is served by a large
number of nearby and low-price sources will have a low Pi and will therefore be a market
where it is difficult to obtain a high market share.
Equation (2) can be manipulated to obtain an estimate of φij. First, divide mij by mii,
the region i’s imports from itself. The µiYiPσ−1i cancel since they apply to i’s imports from
all sources. The remaining expressions involve relative numbers of firms and relative costs
in i and j. These ratios can be eliminated by multiplying by the corresponding ratio for
region j: mji/mjj. The result is
mijmji
miimjj
=
φijφji
φiiφjj
. (3)
The standard practice in NEG models is to assume free trade within regions, i.e. φii =
φjj = 1 and symmetric bilateral barriers φji = φij. These assumptions lead to a very simple
estimator for φij:
φˆij =
√
mijmji
miimjj
(4)
The numerator requires only trade flow data expressed according to industry classifica-
tions. The denominator factors are each region’s “imports from self” (or, equivalently,
“exports to self”). They are calculated as the value of all shipments of the industry minus
the sum of shipments to all other regions (exports).
It therefore is fairly easy to give a feeling of the extent of current trade freeness among
the biggest industrialized countries for which bilateral trade flows and production figures
are readily available. We use here the database recentlymade available by theWorld Bank4
combined with the OECD STAN database (the appendix gives details about this data) in
order to calculate values of trade flows and φˆij for distinctive pairs of countries in 1999.
We opt for the United States-Canada and France-Germany as our pairs of countries.
Recalling that 0 < φˆij < 1 with 0 denoting prohibitive trade costs, the overall level of
trade costs in Table 1 seems to be very high. We can obtain from φˆ an estimate of the ad
valorem equivalent of all impediments to trade between the United States and Canada.
The calculation requires an estimate of the price elasticity σ. Using the lowest Head and
Ries (2001) estimate of σ for US-Canada trade in manufactured goods (8), trade costs have
an ad valorem equivalent ranging from τ − 1 = 0.717−1/7 − 1 = 4.9% for Canada-US auto
trade to just over 36% for Canada-US trade in clothing andGermany-France trade in autos.
With the exception of North American auto trade, the level of trade freeness appears to be
quite low, even though we have chosen pairs of countries known for their high levels of
formal trade integration.
The starkest predictions of NEGmodels deal with the possibly dramatic consequences
of trade liberalization on agglomeration. It is often assumed that we live in an era of trade
4http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/data/TradeandProduction.html.
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Table 1: The φ-ness of trade in 1999 for North America and Europe, selected industries,
import values in millions of US$.
Textiles, apparel & leather
country foreign source (mij) domestic source (mii) odds (mij/mii) φˆ
Canada 3232.48 6275.55 0.515
0.111
USA 3437.03 144731.00 0.024
Germany 1955.14 9742.13 0.201
0.130
France 1604.72 19095.45 0.084
Motor vehicles & parts
country foreign source (mij) domestic source (mii) odds (mij/mii) φˆ
Canada 41069.02 13257.20 3.098
0.717
USA 58776.02 354653.00 0.166
Germany 7468.84 101719.28 0.073
0.114
France 9842.01 55179.41 0.178
integration and that would here translate into a trend of rising φˆ over time. Do we actually
observe this trend in the φˆ data?
We consider, in Figure 1, the evolution of trade freeness for three distinctive country
pairs. We can indeed see that international trade is getting easier over the recent period.
The rate of progress is not the same for all country pairs, with North America being the
fastest integrating region since the end of the eighties. The pace of trade integration also
seems to be more important since the late eighties in the European Union, as can be seen
from the France-Italy combination for which a longer time period is available.5 It is note-
worthy that the change in the pace of integration for the median industry seems to corre-
spond in both regions to the starting date of implementation of a major trade liberalization
agreement (the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement in January 1989 and the Single Euro-
pean Act in January 1987). This observed rise in φˆ is a sort of pre-requisite for any test
of the main predictions of NEG models: Although remaining at surprisingly low levels,
the integration of the world economy is rising, which corresponds to the typical thought
experiment of NEG theoretical predictions.
5Note that the fact that trade is consistently freer in the Franco-German than in the Franco-Italian combi-
nation is consistent with the smaller bilateral distance in the former as compared to the latter (411 against 550
miles in Head and Mayer, 2000).
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Figure 1: Evolution of median-industry φ-ness of trade
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3.2 Profits as a function of market potential
Returning to the firm’s location decision, total production cost in each region is assumed
to take the form cjqj + Fj. Increasing returns come from a plant-specific fixed costs Fj,
qj is the total output of the representative firm in j and cj is the constant marginal cost
of production. Each firm maximizes the following gross profit function for each market:
piij = (pj − cj)τijqij. The resulting mill prices are simple mark-ups over marginal costs:
pj =
cjσ
σ− 1.
The gross profit earned in each market i for a variety produced in region j is given by
piij = (pijqij)/σ. Substituting in equation (2) and then summing the profits earned in
each market and subtracting the plant-specific fixed cost, Fj, we obtain the net profit to be
earned in each potential location j:
Πj =
1
σ
c1−σj RMPj − Fj, (5)
where RMPj = ∑i φijµiYiP
σ−1
i . RMP is an abbreviation of Real Market Potential. Redding
and Venables (2000) derive the same term (except they do not use φij notation) and call
it market access. To maintain continuity with prior work (from Harris, 1954, to Fujita et
al. 1999), we instead employ the term market potential. The “real” is added in order to
contrast it with an alternative formulation that we refer to as Nominal Market Potential or
NMPj = ∑i φijµiYi. The “nominal” refers to the absence of an adjustment for variation in
the price index term Pi.
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Davis and Weinstein (2003a) use a variant of NMP in which they set φij = dδij where
dij is the distance between locations i and j and δ is the coefficient on ln dij in a gravity
equation estimation using industry level bilateral trade. Since usual estimates of δ do
not differ greatly from minus one6, 1/dij is a reasonable approximation for φij. Further
assuming the share of income devoted to each industry does not vary across countries,
one obtains NMPj ∝ ∑i Yi/dij, where Yi is an aggregate measure of demand such as GDP
or retail sales. Thus, NMP is proportional to the original formulation of market potential
used by Harris (1954) and in subsequent work of geographers.
Nominal Market Potential is intuitively appealing and not very difficult to implement
empirically. However, the omission of the price index adjustment P1−σi effectively severs
the link with the underlying profit maximization problem. The reason is simple. Large
demand translates into large profits if profit margins and market shares are high. The
more competitors there are in a given location, and the more competitors that have low-
cost access to that location, and the lower the marginal costs of those local and nearby
competitors—that is to say the lower is Pi—the lower will be any particular firm’s share
of market i. In other words, a large market that is extremely well-served by existing firms
might offer considerably less potential for profits than a smaller market with fewer com-
petitors in the vicinity. NMP might still be useful for some purposes. For instance since
it does not depend on locations of firms or on industry level costs, both of which are
endogenous in economic geography models, NMP might be a good instrument for RMP.
However, a regression that includes just NMP is, at best, a reduced formwhose coefficients
must be interpreted with great caution.
4 Market Potential Raises Factor Prices
The impact of market potential on factor prices can be seen by solving for the variable
costs in region j that would set the profit equation, (5), equal to zero.
cj =
(
RMPj
σFj
)1/(σ−1)
.
Suppose, following Redding and Venables (2000), that cj is function of wages (w),
prices of other primary factors (v), and intermediate input prices. If all firms use the same
basket of intermediates, then Pj is also the appropriate intermediate price index. Assum-
ing a Cobb-Douglas form, we obtain cj = Pαj w
β
j v
γ
j . Suppose further that fixed costs are
proportional to variable costs, i.e. Fj = f cj = f Pαj w
β
j v
γ
j where f is a constant determining
the strength of increasing returns. After making substitutions and rearranging we have
β lnwj + γ ln vj = − 1
σ
ln(σ f ) +
1
σ
ln RMPj − α ln Pj. (6)
Redding and Venables (2000) and Hanson (1998) proceed to the empirical implemen-
tation of various versions of this equation linking factor prices to market potential.7 There
are three terms to be estimated in the complete version of this equation. The two most
6Disdier and Head (2003) find a mean of −0.87 in meta-analysis of 896 coefficients supplied by 55 different
papers.
7The first published derivation of the wage-potential equation seems to be the 1991 working paper version
of Krugman (1993).
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important concern the real market potential on one hand and the price index on the other
hand. Note that (6) is closely linked to (5): High RMP for a region predicts a relatively
high profit for firms located there. In the long run, when free entry drives profits every-
where towards zero, the input prices have to rise to absorb those extra profits in high RMP
regions.
Note also that the price index, Pj, appears twice in the factor price equation. It first
appears in the RMP term where it acts as a weight on NMP, accounting for the number
of potential suppliers to each market, discounted if they have poor access or charge high
prices. The price index also enters as the aggregate prices of intermediate inputs. Based on
the assumption that firms consume all varieties of competitors as inputs, costs are lower
when those input-output linkages are relatively free from trade costs, i.e. when the price
index is low, signifying that (input-supplying) competitors are relatively close from your
place of production.
Equation (6) bears a close resemblance to the equation estimated by Dekle and Eaton
(1999). They relate a share-weighted index of wages and land rents in Japanese prefec-
tures to a term that sums across incomes discounted by distance. There are important
differences in theoretical motivation that also result in subtle, but important, differences
in specification. Dekle and Eaton (1999) assume agglomeration economies taking a tech-
nological form in which the production function has a neutral shift term that depends on
nearby economic activity. Their term is a variant of NMP that assumes an exponential
distance decay function. Thus, it differs from RMP because of the absence of the price
index term. In principle this distinction might be used to break the observational equiva-
lence between NEG approaches to factor price determination and approaches that invoke
spatial technological externalities.
4.1 Market Potential and international income inequality
The left hand side of (6) is a cost-share weighted sum of logged primary factor prices. A
natural proxy for this is the log of GDP per capita or ln GDPC. Adding an error term we
have
lnGDPC = ζ +
1
σ
ln R̂MPj +
α
σ− 1 ln ŜPj + ε j, (7)
where SPj ≡ P1−σj stands for supply potential (referred to as “supplier access” by Redding
and Venables, 2000). This is the key equation estimated in Redding and Venables (2000).
The authors obtain the RMP and SP terms needed for this regression using estimates from
the bilateral trade equation of the model.8 Indeed, using the fact that bilateral trade vol-
umes mij = njpijqij, where pijqij is given by (2), we obtain
lnmij = FXj + ln φij + FMi, (8)
where the variables FXj and FMi are exporter and importer fixed effects respectively, with
theoretical correspondence FXj = ln
(
njc1−σj
)
and FMi = ln
(
Pσ−1i µiYi
)
. Therefore, a bilat-
eral trade flow regression in a first step provides estimates of φij and fixed effects that can
be used to construct ŜPj = ∑i exp(FXi)φij and R̂MPj = ∑i exp(FMi)φij.
8This two step procedure where the first step makes use of the gravity-like prediction of bilateral trade
patterns in empirical implementations of the NEG model originates in the 1998 NBER working paper version
of Davis and Weinstein (2003a) and is also adopted by Head and Mayer (2002).
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Equation (8) is fitted by Redding and Venables (2000) on a sample of 101 countries
for the year 1994 with bilateral distance and contiguity being used to estimate φij in this
gravity-like regression. The two variables of interest SPj and RMPj are then constructed
for the same set of countries in 1996 with a distinction between the domestic and foreign com-
ponents of those potential variables. Three different sets of variables are constructed which
use different proxies for φii, the internal trade costs, supposed to be linked in alternative
ways to the internal distance of a country approximated by dii = 2/3
√
area/pi.9 Supplier
and market potential are regressed separately because of strong correlation in the series,
most of the analysis uses RMP regressions. Note that the method of calculating φii relative
to φij has important implications for the results. It can be seen from the definition of RMP
that any overestimate of freeness of internal trade relative to international trade will give
higher relative weight to local GDP in the RMP calculation. In the limit, if φii approaches
1 and φij approaches 0 for all international trade flows, only local GDP will be considered
in market potential and the estimation will be dangerously approaching a regression of
GDP per capita against GDP. This issue is extremely clear when comparing results from
the two last RMP specifications in their Figures 3 and 4 graphing the log of GDP per capita
against the log of RMP(2) and RMP(3) respectively. The definitions of those variables are
such that RMP(3) divides the coefficient applied to internal distance in φii calculation by
two compared to RMP(2). This systematically increases the weight of local GDP in mar-
ket potential calculation and not surprisingly increases the fit of the regression as remote
but high-income countries like Australia see their remoteness reduced through the larger
weight put on local GDP.
A natural way to correct for this problem is to run regressions with only the foreign
component of market potential. The authors show that this component alone can explain
an impressive 35% of GDP per capita variation across the sample. The full specification
with RMP(3) makes the figure rise to near 75%. Robustness checks are conducted with
first inclusion of recently successful variables of the cross-country growth literature (en-
dowments in natural resources, physical geography, quality of institutions). The NEG
variables measuring access retain their influence. The problem with focusing on the for-
eign component is that the theory clearly calls for local wages to be increasing in the size
of the local market. Based on foreign market potential only, one would expect Canada to pay
substantially higher wages than the United States.
The ideal solution would be to construct RMP using domestic and foreign market po-
tential, but to instrument for it in the regression analysis to solve the endogeneity problem
(income enters on both sides of the equation). Redding and Venables (2000) take this ap-
proach, using distance to New York City, Brussels, and Tokyo as the instruments. This
approach removes contemporaneous shocks to local income per capita. Since the location
of these centers of high income are not themselves exogenous in the long run (i.e. why
not Rio de Janeiro, Lagos, and Delhi?), we see much scope for future development of the
instrumental variable approach.
4.2 Market potential and interregional real wage differences
In a seminal paper on estimation of wage equations, Hanson (1998) adopts a similar model
structure for his study of market potential inside the United States.10 One difference is that
9This measure makes the assumption that each country is a disk where all producers are located in the
center and consumers are located uniformly over the area.
10We refer here to the 2001 revised version of a paper first issued as a 1998 NBER working paper.
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he omits intermediate inputs and primary factors other than labor from the production
function. Imposing α = γ = 0 and β = 1 in (6), the iso-profit condition reduces to
lnwj = − 1
σ
ln(σ f ) +
1
σ
ln RMPj = − 1
σ
ln(σ f ) +
1
σ
ln
(
∑
i
µiYiφijPσ−1i
)
. (9)
Hanson (1998) then imposes two additional equilibrium conditions. First, he assumes that
free migration equalizes real wages across locations. The model follows Helpman (1998)
in replacing the agricultural good in the upper level utility function of individuals with
housing. Denoting Hi as the housing stock in i and PHi the price of housing, real wage
equalization implies wiP
−µi
i (P
H
i )
−(1−µi) = C, ∀i, where C is a constant.11 The second
equilibrium condition is that housing payments equal housing expenditure: PHi Hi = (1−
µi)Yi. It is then possible to replace the two price terms in (9), and obtain:12
lnwj = B+
1
σ
ln
[
∑
i
Y
σ(µ−1)+1
µ
i w
σ−1
µ
i H
(σ−1)(1−µ)
µ
i φij
]
, (10)
with B a function of C, µ, σ and f , constant over all locations i. The first difference of this
last equation as well as a simplified version omitting the price index in the market po-
tential (and therefore closer to nominal market potential) are estimated using a nonlinear
least squares estimation procedure. Concentrating on the specification most linked to the-
ory, the principal result is that the estimated coefficients imply parameters consistent with
the underlying theoretical framework, with a reasonably good overall fit (0.347 for the
1980-1990 period). The analysis produced for all 3075 US counties shows that the higher
are personal incomes, wages and housing stocks in proximate locations, the greater will
be the local wage. An appealing feature of the approach is that the estimation of the wage
equation provides estimates of key parameters of the model. This is useful per se but also
can be used as a device to check the consistency of the results with the underlying the-
oretical framework. The estimate of σ ranges between 4.9 and 7.6, which corresponds to
recent estimates in the literature by Head and Ries (2001) or Lai and Trefler (2002) for in-
stance. Those values of σ are interesting first because they confirm recent results through
a very different estimation strategy, but also because those estimates are consistent with
reasonable values for other equilibrium relationships in the model: With those high σ, the
equilibriummarkup of prices over marginal costs in the model, σ/(σ− 1), is between 1.15
and 1.25. The expenditure share of the IRS traded good, µ is estimated to be between
0.91 and 0.97, which lies within the 0-1 range but is much higher than the actual share
of expenditures on manufactured goods.13 Another interpretation on parameters values
11This assumption, present in Helpman (1998), is somewhat restrictive. Indeed, imposing equality in real
wages in the original Krugman (1991a) framework forces the model to be at the symmetric equilibrium, for
if the equilibrium was agglomerated, it would yield a core-periphery outcome and the region hosting the
manufacturing industry would pay a higher real wage as in Figure 5.2 in Fujita et al. (1999). However, due
to the presence of the housing sector, the Helpman (1998) model can exhibit interior agglomerated equilibria
that satisfy the real wage equalization assumption. This assumption, while not innocuous, seems defensible
as long as the sample under consideration does not exhibit a core-periphery outcome (which is obviously very
rare).
12Note that Hanson (1998) makes the additional assumption that µi = µ, ∀i. Also the ln function is
missing for the market potential term in this version.
13The set of unreported robustness checks include a specification replacing the housing sector by a Krugman
(1991a) freely traded agricultural product. Estimates of σ and τ are similar but µ is estimated to be between
1.5 and 2.
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is that, in the Helpman (1998) model, the equivalent of the “no black hole condition” of
Fujita et al. (1999) is that σ(1− µ) < 1. If this condition is not satisfied, the equilibrium
is always dispersed (remember that the prediction of the model, in terms of relationship
between agglomeration and trade costs, in Helpman (1998) is the reverse of Krugman’s
(1991a) one), independently of trade costs. All specifications yield values of parameters
satisfying this condition. The econometric analysis therefore reveal that the wage equation
seems to fit well the spatial variation of wages within the United States. It is noteworthy
that the full implementation of the theory-based wage equation obtains a better fit than
the simpler wage equation based on Harris (1954) market potential.
To give a clearer view of the extent to which geographymatters in the determination of
wages in the United States, Hanson (1998) then proceeds to simulations of the model with
the parameters estimated. The exercise simulates a negative 10% shock on the income in
Illinois. The impact of this shock onwages drops very rapidly with distance: 74 kilometers
away from the initial shock, wages fall by only 0.43%, in St Louis (345 kilometers away),
the fall is down to 0.32%, and wages are unchanged at a distance of 885 kilometers. This
extremely strong impact of distance onwage response to localized shocks is the translation
of the trade cost parameter estimated which implies that travelling 2 kilometers multiplies
the price of a good by exp(2× 1.97) = 51.4 (usingHanson ,1998, specification of trade costs
and his estimate for the 1970-1980 regression). This disturbingly large estimate may be a
consequence of the function form of the distance decay function. Hanson (1998) assumes
τij = exp(tdij), the formulation used by Krugman (1993) in his original theoretical deriva-
tion of the wage equation and by Dekle and Eaton (1999) in their empirical work. The
vast empirical literature estimating gravity equations suggests that τij should be a power
function of distance of the form τij = dδij, as the log of trade flows is unanimously found to
decrease linearly with the log of distance (usually with slope near −1).
The above analysis by Gordon Hanson is a structural estimation of the wage equation
linking positively nominal wage to market access within the United States. The chap-
ter by Combes and Overman discusses some recent work that applies the Hanson (1998)
methodology to wages in European countries. While the Hanson (1998) and Redding
and Venables (2000) papers both draw on the iso-profit equation’s implications for spa-
tial wage variation, they make different assumptions about worker mobility and use very
different econometric strategies. Future work should evaluate these differences and their
implications.
Non-structural methods can also be useful for assessing the relationship between ac-
cess and factor prices. With an important external trade liberalization, the internal geog-
raphy of production is likely to change rapidly as foreign markets rise in importance to
domestic producers. The quality of access to foreign consumers may gain weight in the
location decision relative to former domestic centers of consumption.
Hanson (1997) takes the example of trade liberalization in Mexico which provides a
natural experiment of this process, as the country experienced a 40-year period of protec-
tionism ending abruptly in 1985, when the country liberalized foreign trade dramatically.
The fact that centrally-located Mexico City concentrated such a large proportion of indus-
trial activity before liberalization combined with the proximity, location and size of the US
economy, makes the evolution of wage gradients inside the Mexican economy the basis of
a reduced form estimation of market access forces at work.
Hanson (1997) uses as a dependent variable the wage in each Mexican region relative
to Mexico City wage in the same industry. The explanatory variables are distances to the
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capital and to the nearest major United States border crossing, together with the same
variable interacted with a post-1985 dummy variable. Industry and year fixed effects are
included. The results show indeed that distance to industry centers has a negative influ-
ence on relative wages. A 10% increase in distance to Mexico City reduces wages by 1.92%
whereas the same increase in distance to the US border reduces wages by 1.28%. Access
to markets indeed matters for local wages. The other main prediction however receives
less support. The change in trade policy occurred in 1985, but there seems to be no strong
evidence of a strong change in wage gradients (diminished impact of distance to Mexico
City and increased impact of distance to US) after this date.14 There is some evidence of
wage compression over time from 1965 to 1988 in the country, but this movement is not
much more pronounced in the end of the sample and was in fact quite stable over the pe-
riod. The interpretation Hanson (1997) favors is that the older maquiladora programme
(launched in 1965 and providing massive liberalization on input imports for exporting
plants) had already contributed to the theoretically expected wage compression.
Even if all methodological issues have not yet been resolved, the results surveyed in
this section point to an apparent empirical success of the wage equation (and more gener-
ally of the price aspect of market size effects), which constitutes an important mechanism
of NEG models.
5 Market Potential Attracts Factor Inflows
With micro data one may explore how firms’ and workers’ location decisions depend on
market and supply potential. Two types of location choices can be studied, location choice
of production units by firms and location choice of individuals through migrations. Such
analysis can be interpreted as empirical test of the existence of: 1) Backward linkages (are
firms attracted to locations with large demand for their products?) 2) Forward linkages (are
consumer-workers attracted to locations with high industrial production?).
5.1 Firm locations and downstream demand
Consider first the location decisions of firms. Firms wish to choose the location that leads
to highest expected profits. Thus a firm will choose location j if it expects Πj to exceed
Πk for all k 6= j. Firms that appear identical to the econometrician (same investment tim-
ing and industry, etc.) often choose different locations. As a result, it is conventional to
assume that there are unobserved components to the profit function. When those unob-
served components have a distribution given by a multivariate extreme value, parameters
of the profit equation yielding location choices can be estimated by the conditional logit
model initiated by Daniel McFadden. Carlton (1983) was the first to apply this model to
choice of production sites by firms. Most recent work following this methodology studies
the determinants of foreign affiliates’ location choices (foreign direct investment samples
have the advantage of presenting relatively footloose location choices that are often con-
centrated over a relatively short period of time) and incorporate a variable or a set of
14The evidence of a diminishing importance of distance toMexico City is slightly stronger in Hanson (1996).
This paper (the first of this stream of work on changes in regional manufacturing activity in Mexico) focuses
on regional wages in the apparel industry, for which the strength of linkages with upstream US firms might
be sufficiently high to yield rapid and measurable changes in location patterns.
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variables accounting for the “quality” of access of each alternative location to downstream
demand. Table 2 gives some examples of such work.
Table 2: Downstream demand variables used in location choice studies
Reference Origin of in-
vestors
Location choices Demand measurement
Coughlin et al. (1991) All foreign in-
vestors
American States State per capita income
Devereux and Grif-
fith (1998)
United States U.K., France, Ger-
many
Share of total apparent consump-
tion in the industry
Friedman et al. (1992) All foreign in-
vestors
American States Gravity measure of states’ per
capita income
Head et al. (1999) Japan American States State personal income + sum of the
contiguous states’ personal income
Henderson and Kun-
coro (1996)
Indonesia Indonesian districts District population + distance to
the nearest large town
In general, this kind of literature only considers rather simple demand specifications
that either consists solely of local income or of ad hoc constructions that try to incorporate
both local size of demand and more distant sources of consumption. The precise construc-
tion used varies from adding the income from contiguous locations (Head et al., 1999) to
using a gravity-type measure of incomes bearing some resemblance with NMP (Friedman
et al., 1992). The vast majority of the results yield positive coefficients, confirming the
intuition that firms value proximity to consumers. The structural interpretation of those
coefficients is however problematic as even NMP is only a rough approximation of what
a fully specified market potential variable (RMP) should be.
For many suppliers of intermediate inputs, the relevant “consumers” are downstream
firms. Smith and Florida (1994) examine the location decisions of about 200 Japan-based
auto parts suppliers that established factories in the United States during the 1980s. They
found a strong attractive influence of the location of Japan-owned auto assembly facto-
ries. Head et al. (1995) exploit the Japanese institution of vertical keiretsu to examine the
co-location of vertically related factories of 751 Japanese plants established in the U.S. be-
tween 1980 and 1990. They found that members of the same keiretsu tended to choose the
same states. This tendency was large and statistically significant even after controlling for
agglomeration effects at the industry level. Moreover, states that were adjacent to loca-
tions that had attracted keiretsu investment were more likely to be chosen than states with
no nearby keiretsu investment. This suggests that a spatial nature to the linkage rather than
mere emulation of location choices.
Head and Mayer (2002) explore the firms’ side of location decisions based on a struc-
tural model of the market access motive. This paper studies a sample of 452 affiliates
that Japanese firms established in 57 regions belonging to 9 European countries (Belgium,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and the United King-
dom) during the period 1984–1995. When an affiliate chooses its location, the only rel-
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evant information is the ordering of profits over alternative locations. Monotonic trans-
formations can therefore be made to the profit function (5) in order to obtain an additive
expression for the profitability of each location. Specifically, we add Fj, multiply by σ, and
take logs, yielding
Vj ≡ ln[σ(Πj + Fj)] = −(σ− 1) ln cj + ln RMPj. (11)
As in Hanson (1998) and Redding and Venables (2000), the central issue is the con-
struction of the RMPj variable. Head and Mayer (2002) make use of the trade equation of
this model seen in section 3.1. The methodology is, in this respect, close to Redding and
Venables (2000). Estimation of a transformed version of the bilateral trade equationmij en-
ables to obtain the parameters needed for the calculation (whereas Redding and Venables,
2000, can be interpreted as a direct estimation of the entire RMPj term).
Using vj = njpjq∗ as a notation for the value of production in the considered industry
in region j (q∗ standing for the individual output of firms, constant in this model if firms
share the same technology), CLij as a dummy variable set to one for countries sharing
a common language, and the assumption that trade costs are positively influenced by
distance (with elasticity δ) and negatively related to common language (with elasticity λ),
the estimated trade equation derived from (1) is
ln
(
mij
mii
)
− ln
(
vj
vi
)
= −b− (σ− 1) ln
(
pj
pi
)
− δ ln
(
dij
dii
)
+ λCLij + eij, (12)
where exp(−b) gives, everything else equal, the ratio of intra-national to international
trade (the, large, negative impact of the political borders on trade flows first uncovered
by McCallum, 1995). The estimated parameters (σˆ, bˆ, δˆ, λˆ) are then used (together with
industry-level apparent consumption, wages and number of competitors for each region j
needed in RMPj) to construct the market potential variable included in the location choice
analysis of Japanese firms in Europe. The formulas used for the construction of trade costs
are
φij = τ1−σij = e
−bˆ+λˆCLijd−δˆij for i 6= j and φii = τ1−σii = d−δˆii .
The cj variable can be given several specifications in empirical work. In their most com-
plete setting, Head and Mayer (2002) consider typical labour market and fiscal determi-
nants of production costs (wages, unemployment rate, social charges, corporate tax rate
and regional subsidy eligibility). The paper also incorporates two proxies for other intra-
industry externalities into the cost function intended to capture the possibility that clus-
tering leads to direct economic benefits such as access to workers with specialized skills
or knowledge sharing between competitors.
There are three main specifications of the market potential estimated, the first one cor-
responds to the theoretical equation (11), the second reduces market potential to the Har-
ris (1954) formula which simplifies the assumed trade costs and neglects the impact of
competitors on the location choice. The third specification follows Redding and Venables
(2000) and separates RMPj into local and nonlocal components. In nested logit estimates (a
discrete choice model that allows for the correlation of error terms among location alterna-
tives inside a same country) Head and Mayer (2002) obtain a point estimate of 1.26 on the
RMPj term. This implies that a 10% rise in themarket potential of a European region yields
to a 10.5% increase in the probability of this region being chosen by a Japanese investor.
The near unitary effect of market potential corresponds to the theoretical prediction and
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the goodness of fit of the different regressions as well as the coefficients suggest a small
preference for the RMPj specification of market potential over the Harris (1954) version.
However the specification yielding the highest fit is the one separating local and nonlocal
components of the market potential term. The striking result of this specification is that
the local component of demand has a clearly dominant influence on location choices.
A last result is that the variables embodying other intra-industry externalities retain a
strong positive effect on location choices regardless of the estimation technique and mar-
ket potential formulation. The previous findings of agglomeration effects using the same
type of variables are very common in the literature (Head et al. 1995, Devereux and Grif-
fith, 1998, Guimara˜es et al., 2000, Crozet et al., forthcoming, for instance). Those previous
results could have been caused by a mis-specification of the demand term, described as
(various forms of) local income of the locations, and therefore be proven invalid when
considering market potential properly. Head and Mayer (2002) show evidence of the con-
trary: Even when final demand linkages are appropriately controlled for through the mar-
ket potential term, direct agglomeration effects appear to retain a powerful role in location
choices. This suggests that the backward linkage NEG mechanism might not be the only or
even the main driver of clustering behavior by firms (at least by foreign investors).
5.2 Worker locations and forward linkages
What about the empirical validity of the forward linkage? Workers choose locations to max-
imize expected real wages after taking into account mobility costs. Let us denote real
wages in i with ωi, given by nominal wages divided by the aggregate price index. The
latter depends on the modern sector’s price index, Pi, with expenditure share µ and the
traditional (often considered to be agriculture) sector price pZi with share 1 − µ. Under
standard assumptions pZi is normalized to one. Hence the log real wage is given by
lnωj = lnwj − µ ln Pj. (13)
In the Krugman (1991a) version, worker movement is governed by a very simple equa-
tion: λ˙i = κ(ωi − ω¯)λi. This formulation does not consider mobility costs and the high
likelihood of heterogeneity in the cost of re-locating. Discrete choice models offer a much
more realistic treatment of mobility without sacrificing tractability.15 Suppose that utility
in region j is given by lnωj + ej, where ej describes heterogeneous nonpecuniary benefits
living in region j. The probability of moving from i to j is given by the probability that
(lnwj − lnwi) + µ(ln Pi − ln Pj)− ρ+ ej − ei > 0, where ρ represents the mean relocation
costs. Making distributional assumptions for ei − ej, we can estimate the responsiveness
of location choice to proximity to producers. Although an estimation of this sort lies at
the core of the propositions of NEG, we are not aware of any papers to have done so with
micro data. Crozet (2000) has estimated a similar proposition with aggregate flow data in a
structural estimation of a NEG model.
His framework incorporates a third industry, a nontraded service sector, which (as in
Hanson, 1998) enables the predictions of the theoretical model to be less dramatic, the
periphery always maintaining some production in the manufacturing industry. The real
wage equation is then transformed to be lnωj = lnwj − µ ln PXj − ψ ln PYj , X and Y being
15Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) show that allowing for probabilistic migration due to taste heterogeneity has
important effects in the NEG model they consider. Murata (2003) confirms this finding in a Dixit-Stiglitz-
Krugman framework.
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the manufacturing and service industries respectively. Crozet (2000) envisions a mobility
cost specification similar to the one in discrete choice models with a deterministic and a
random component. Keeping the same notation as above, the number of migrants from j
to i is shown to be equal to
migji =
ωi
ωj
ei
ρji
,
where ei is the probability of finding a job in location i (assumed proportional to the em-
ployment rate in i) and ρji ≡ (dij + cBij)ν, the bilateral mobility cost, assumed positively
related to bilateral distance and non-contiguity (Bij is a dummy variable set to one for
contiguous regions). The central equation of the paper is obtained by using migji together
with traditional pricing rules, the proportional relationship between the number of vari-
eties and the labour force of this model, and the definition of price indexes:
migji =
(
wi
wj
)1−ψ(LYi
LYj
) ψ
σY−1
(
∑k LXk φkiw
1−σX
k
∑k LXk φkjw
1−σX
k
) µ
σX−1 ei
ρji
(14)
Several things can be learned from this equation. First, leaving aside relative nominal
wage, this expression has some resemblance with the gravity equation. Bilateral flows of
workers are positively related to the relative size of the hosting region (because a large
host region produces a large share of available varieties and has therefore a low overall
price index). The distance term is here related to the mobility costs. Second, the large cen-
tral term in (14) is related to the nominal market potential (NMP) defined above. It indeed
consists of trade cost-weighted sums of market sizes (number of workers here instead of
incomes in NMP). Access (which Crozet, 2000, refers to as “centrality”) is an attractive
characteristic for regions here, like in the location choice of firms. However, it should be
noted that the reason is intrinsically different: Good access is attractive for firms and for
workers because of their high market potential, which translates either in high expected
profits (equation 11) or higher nominal wages (equation 7). This dimension appears in the
first nominal wage term of (14), but there is an additional aspect that makes access attrac-
tive for workers yielded by the large availability of nearby producers and corresponding
low price index. Note that the corresponding effect for firms is yielded by low price of
inputs in central places, which is given by the supply potential term (SPj ≡ P1−σj ) in equa-
tion (7).
Crozet (2000) proceeds to a transformation of (14), yielding a structurally estimable
(through nonlinear least squares, very much in the spirit of Hanson, 1998 and Lai and
Trefler, 2002) specification. The sample consists of internal bilateral migration flows be-
tween regions of Germany (period 1983–1992), Spain (period 1983–1993), Italy (period
1983–1993), The Netherlands (period 1988–1994), and the United Kingdom (period 1980–
1985).
The main results of interest here are the impact of market access on migration in-
flows. The estimated parameters correspond to signs and magnitudes predicted by the
theoretical framework, with a good overall predictive power of the regressions. The most
interesting parameters are σ and δ, the CES and the elasticity of trade costs to distance
respectively. All estimates of σ lie significantly above 1, ranging from 1.3 for the United
Kingdom to 4.3 for the Netherlands. Estimates of δ are also systematically significantly
positive across countries, with a very high average value of 1.8 but considerable variation
across countries (over 3 in Germany to 0.5 in Spain).
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Like Hanson’s (1998) simulations of the geographical dissipation factor of a negative
shock to Illinois income, Crozet (2000) proceeds to use parameter estimates to evaluate
theoretical predictions numerically. The prediction he examines is the break point of trade
costs below which the symmetrical equilibrium of his model is not stable anymore and
the country should exhibit an increasing core-periphery structure. This is done for each
country in terms of relative distance below which the core-periphery should be the only
equilibrium. The idea can be summarized as a calculation, for each major region in the
country, as a radius defining a surrounding area where the activity would tend to be “at-
tracted” to the central region. It appears that those relative distances are very small, which
means that significant core-periphery patterns can only happen on very small distances.
An example from the paper is that the German region of Bayern with an internal distance
of about 100 kilometers is predicted to attract all IRS activities located within a radius of
120 kilometers from its center. It does not seem to threaten any other important region.
This calculation does not incorporate migration costs, and a last exercise conducted by
Crozet (2000) uses all estimated parameters to calculate the equilibrium predicted num-
ber of migrants for equalized nominal wages arising from (14). The number of predicted
migrants (actually roughly consistent with real ones) is strikingly low, even for very large
differences in size and very small relative distances. Put together, these results point to the
empirical relevance of agglomeration forces operating through forward linkages, but those forces
are likely to stay very localized, unable to generate core-periphery patterns in Europe at a large
geographical level, at least as long as labour remains so sensitive to migration costs.
6 Home Market/Magnification Effects
There are three closely related predictions regarding the effects of market size asymmetries
on the geographic distribution of industry activity that have come to be known as “home
market effects.” Krugman (1980) initiates the literature by demonstrating that the country
with the larger number of consumers of an industry’s goods will run a trade surplus in
that industry. Further development of the model in Helpman and Krugman (1985) shows
that the larger country’s share of firms in the increasing returns industry exceeds its share
of consumers. They also show that increases in a country demand lead to more than one-
for-one increases in production.
6.1 The magnification of production
The Krugman (1980) formulation relates ratios of numbers of firms to ratios of numbers
of consumers. In particular, Krugman imagines two equal size countries with different
preferences. The relative size of country i’s home market in terms of our notation would
be µi/µj. Its relative number of firms (and relative production) would be ni/nj. Expressed
in our notation, Equation (25) of Krugman (1980) shows that
ni
nj
=
µi/µj − φ
1− φµi/µj .
Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1999, 2003a) use the derivative to motivate their estimation:
d(ni/nj)
d(µi/µj)
=
1− φ2
(1− φ[µi/µj])2 > 1.
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They term this result the “magnification effect”. Note that starting from a point of sym-
metric preferences, that is where µi = µj,
d(ni/nj)
d(µi/µj)
=
1+ φ
1− φ .
Inspection of this expression reveals that increasing “free-ness” of trade leads to a magni-
fication of the magnification effect.
Empirical work based on Krugman (1980) must confront three important issues re-
lated to the difference between model and data dimensionality. The model (as most of the
subsequent theoretical work on the topic) assumes 1 factor, 2 industries, and 2 countries.
These assumptions raise the following questions for empirical analysis.
1. How can one allow for factor proportions to influence the trade pattern as in the tra-
ditional model of trade? Tests of new trade need to be compared with an alternative
of H-O trade.
2. How do we model the relationships between multiple industries? Krugman (1980)
considered one industry models where balanced trade required higher wages in the
large country. He also considered a two-industry model where balanced trade was
achieved by making one country having “mirror image” differences in preferences.
This allowed for idiosyncratic demand to determine the location of production at the
industry level while retaining equal wages in equilibrium. Helpman and Krugman
(1985) gives a role for absolute differences in country size by assuming that there is
a zero trade cost constant returns sector that equates wages and absorbs any trade
imbalances caused by home market effects operating on the IRS industry. In actual
data the mirror image assumption certainly fails and the CRS sector probably does
not have zero trade costs or the ability to absorb all trade imbalances.
3. How do we construct demandmeasures in the presence of more than two countries?
Indeed how does one even formulate the home market effect hypothesis? The ratios
and shares of the theoretical formulations neglect third country effects.
In addition to these three conceptual problems, there is also a practical problem. What
data should be used to measure demand differences? The obvious approach is to use
something called “apparent consumption” or “domestic absorption.” This starts with do-
mestic production adds imports and subtracts exports. While the measure is sensible, it
requires trade data measured in a way so as to make them comparable with production
data. The underlying data are collected by different agencies (survey and census for pro-
duction, customs offices for trade) using different classification systems. To make trade
and production data comparable across multiple countries is even more difficult.16
Given these four challenges one can understand why the first empirical tests of home
market effects did not appear until 16 years after the publication of the Krugman (1980)
16There are several data sets that attempt to provide compatible trade and production data for a broad set
of countries, industries and years. The World Bank provides a recently assembled data set, with wide overall
coverage (referenced above). The database covers the 1976–1999 period with compatible bilateral trade and
production data at the ISIC 3-digit level (28 industries) for 67 countries and ISIC 4-digit level (81 industries)
for 24 countries.
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paper that coined the term.17 The pioneering paper, Davis and Weinstein’s 1996 NBER
working paper “Does Economic Geography Matter for International Specialization,” was
never published. Nevertheless, its methodology and discussions of its chief results appear
in Davis andWeinstein (1999, 2003a). Prior to considering the results of these three papers
we shall discuss the commonmethod and how it confronted each of the three “dimension-
ality” issues posed above.
Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1999, 2003a) estimate equations that they describe as be-
ing “inspired” by Krugman (1980) but adapted to allow for an important role for factor
endowments. Their specification is estimated in levels, rather than the ratios analyzed by
Krugman (1980). In particular they propose that production of “goods” (the most disag-
gregated classification of industries available) is linearly related to variables called SHARE
and IDIODEM.
Xgr = β1SHAREgr + β2IDIODEMgr + egr. (15)
SHAREgr is not actually a share. Rather it gives a prediction for region r’s production of
a good if its output at the more aggregated level (Xr) were allocated across goods in the
same proportion as the rest of the “world”. Thus suppose we denote Xgr as the value of
r’s production of good g. Then production of the aggregate sums the goods for a given
region: Xr = ∑g Xgr. Production of rest of world for the good and the aggregate are given
by XgR = ∑s 6=r Xgs and XR = ∑g XgR. Expressed in our notation (which suppresses the n
subscript they use for industry aggregates), we have
SHAREgr =
XgR
XR
Xr.
The key variable in the analysis is IDIODEM. It is defined as a deviation from rest-of-
world demand patterns. Recall that we defined Er = µrYr where µr is an expenditure
share parameter and Yr is total income. Applying the same notation as with X, we have
IDIODEMgr =
(
Egr
Er
− EgR
ER
)
Xr.
The term in parentheses measures demand differences. Note that it does not depend on
absolute differences in country size (Yr and YR cancel out in the E ratios). In the absence of
idiosyncratic demand differences, that is for IDIODEMgr = 0, Davis and Weinstein (1996,
1999, 2003a) expect Xgr = SHAREgr and therefore expect β1 to be approximately one.
The specification is augmented by a vector of endowments of land, capital, and labor
by education category called Factors.
Xgr = β1SHAREgr + β2IDIODEMgr +ΩgFactors+ egr. (16)
17Justman (1994) is an early empirical contribution emphasizing the importance of local demand in the pro-
duction hosted by a particular location. His analysis is primarily centered on correlation coefficients between
industry level output and local demand for the good considered among 318 US MSAs. Results point to some
explanatory power of local demand for the good in industry supply location pattern but the link to theory is
rather thin and no reference is actually made to HME or NEG theories. In fact, as emphasized by Davis and
Weinstein (1999), simple correlations are not the appropriate device for hypothesis testing of agglomeration
theories. All sensible theories yield a positive relationship between the location of supply and the location of de-
mand, thus implying positive correlation coefficients. But correlation coefficients cannot distinguish between
more than proportional from less than proportional relationships between supply and demand. A very high
correlation can be associated with either a steep or a flat slope of the link between output and demand.
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They consider this specification to nest comparative advantage (via Factors) and in-
creasing returns (via IDIODEM) in the same specification. Note that the maintained as-
sumption throughout these studies is that Factors determine production at the level of the
industry aggregates Xr.
The estimate of β2 is the focus of the analysis. A coefficient on IDIODEM above one
provides evidence of home market effects. The Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1999, 2003a)
specification might be thought of as a kind of linear approximation of the true model.
Around the point of symmetry then, it may be the case that β2 provides a rough esti-
mate of what Helpman and Krugman (1985) show to be the (magnified) response of the
share of production in r with respect to an increase of the share of demand located in r:
M = (1 + φ)/(1 − φ). Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1999, 2003a) argue that a coefficient
between zero and one implies a comparative advantage world with trade costs. Subse-
quent theoretical results by Feenstra et al. (2001), Trionfetti (2001), and Head et al. (2002)
all cast doubt on this implication. With a fixed number of firms, asymmetric home bias
in preferences, or national product differentiation, it is possible to observe production re-
spond less than one-for-one to demand even in models of imperfect competition without
comparative advantage. The implication does seem to run strongly in the opposite direc-
tion. Models of comparative advantage with constant returns are inconsistent with the
magnifying effect of market size, i.e. βˆ2 > 1 supports increasing returns models.
Coefficients of 0 and 1 on IDIODEM correspond, respectively, to a frictionless and
autarkic CRS world. Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1999, 2003a) do not discuss the interpre-
tation of negative coefficients. We are not aware of any model that generates a negative
relationship between demand and the location of production. Consequently, a finding of
βˆ2 < 0 suggests either sampling error or mis-specification.
The Davis and Weinstein (1999, 2003a) results are considered by many to provide
strong support for home market effects and NEG more generally. In an endnote, Fujita
et al. (1999) write of the paper on Japanese regions published in 1999 that Davis and We-
instein “measure the importance of the home market effect and find surprisingly strong
impacts.” In their review of empirical evidence Baldwin et al. (2003) state that these pa-
pers find “econometric evidence that one agglomeration force—the so-called homemarket
effect—is in operation.”
Table 3: Davis and Weinstein’s “pooled” HME estimates
OECD, DW ’96 Japan, DW ’99 OECD, DW ’03
SHARE (β1) 1.103 0.259 1.033 -1.744 0.96 —
(0.002) (0.198) (0.007) (0.211) (0.01)
IDIODEM (β2) 1.229 0.712 1.416 0.888 1.67 1.57
(0.005) (0.033) (0.025) (0.070) (0.05) (0.10)
Factors No Yes No Yes No Yes
Table 3 presents the pooled results from the three Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1999
and 2003a) papers on home market effects (with standard errors in parentheses). The
result from the 1996 and 1999 studies both indicate that controlling for factors drives the
coefficient on IDIODEM below one. Thus, if one accepts the nested specification proposed
by Davis and Weinstein, the pooled estimates do not support home market effects. The
2003 paper retains βˆ2 > 1 after controlling for Factors but it should be noted that this
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specification omits SHARE. The problem with the pooled results, as noted by the authors,
is that it gives a single answer as to the presence or absence of home market effects. Since
industries differ, it would seem more attractive to let the data indicate which industries
have home market effects and which ones have production patterns determined mainly
by factors.
Table 4: Summary Statistics on Davis and Weinstein’s Disaggregated IDIODEM estimates
Paper/Table Mean βˆ2 Median βˆ2 N % > 1 % Sig > 1 % < 0 % Sig < 0
DW (1999), Japan
Table 6 1.63 0.45 20 45% 40% 40% 5%
DW (2003), OECD
Table 2 (4-digit runs) 1.47 0.95 50 50% 22% 38% 4%
Table 3 (4-digit pooled) 1.20 1.02 13 54% 31% 0 0
Table 4 (3-digit runs) 4.23 0.71 24 37.5% 8.3% 37.5% 12.5%
Table 4 presents some summary statistics on the disaggregated results. The average
values of βˆ2, the coefficient on IDIODEM, are greater than one in all four sets of results,
suggesting that manufacturing industries on average have home market effects. Means
can be strongly influenced by outliers. The median coefficients on IDIODEM are less than
one in three sets of regressions and marginally over one in just Table 3 of the OECD study.
In summary, more than half of the industry level coefficients are less than one and a dis-
turbingly large share are negative. One interpretation of the results is that a sizeable num-
ber of industries (11 out of 50) appear to exhibit home market effects. Another take is that
the industry level estimates are just too noisy to provide solid support for the HME.
Head and Ries (2001) consider home market effects in the context of trade liberaliza-
tion between Canada and the United States, phased in over ten years starting in 1989.
They base their specification on Helpman and Krugman’s (1985) share equation. Help-
man and Krugman (1985) developed a piece-wise linear formulation in terms of shares of
consumers and producers. We reproduce here the formulation expressed in the terms of
our modeling from section 3.1 in a two region (noted i and j) framework. Let λ denote the
share of producers in country i and θ to denote its share of demand. Thus, we would have
λ = ni/N and θ = (µiYi)/E, where E = ∑k µkYk and N = ∑k nk. For interior solutions,
i.e. where ni and nj are both positive, the spatial equilibrium arises at λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Πi(λ∗)−Πj(λ∗) = 0. Using (5), the difference in profits function writes:
Πi(λ∗)−Πj(λ∗) = 1
σ
(c1−σi RMPi − c1−σj RMPj)− (Fi − Fj).
To solve for the spatial equilibrium, the literature typically relies upon a particular spec-
ification of the other sector, referred to as agriculture or “traditional.” The other sector
has constant returns to scale, perfect competition, zero transport costs and a unitary labor
requirement technology. It is also assumed to account for a large share of total consumer
expenditures. All these conditions are used to ensure that, with this sector staying active in
both economies, the price of this good is equalized, therefore equal wages prevail in both
economies for the manufacturing sector as well. With identical technologies this equates
marginal and fixed costs across countries (ci = cj = 1 and Fi = Fj = F)
24
The difference in profits between locations i and j is then given by
Πi(λ∗)−Πj(λ∗) = E
σN
λ(φ− 1)− φ+ θ(φ+ 1)
λ(1− φ)(1− λ) + φ1−φ
 , (17)
In the equilibrium of the Helpman and Krugman (1985) model, producer and demand
shares are therefore related by
λ∗ = 1/2+M(θ − 1/2), (18)
where M = (1 + φ)/(1 − φ). This equation illustrates a number of key ideas. First we
now have a magnification effect that does not vary with the share of demand;M depends
solely on the “phi-ness” of trade:
dλ∗/dθ = M = (1+ φ)/(1− φ) > 1.
The share magnification effect, M, is strictly increasing in φ and therefore decreasing in
transport costs. Ottaviano and Thisse refer to this as the HME magnification result. To
avoid confusion with the primary magnification effect, dλ∗/dθ > 1, we suggest calling
the dM/dφ > 0 result “secondary magnification.” Industry can agglomerate entirely
in one country if the other country is small enough. In particular, the home country
would be pushed out of the “modern” good and specialize in the “traditional” sector if
θ < (1/2)(1− 1/M).
In some respects this result is remarkably robust. The linear demand monopolistic
competition model developed by Ottaviano et al. (2002) and the Brander (1981) model of
segmented markets Cournot competition both deliver the same linear share equation but
with different M.18 Head and Ries (2001) show that the Helpman and Krugman (1985)
model can be contrasted with an alternative of perfect competition with national product
differentiation (also known as the Armington assumption). In that model, dλ∗/dθ = (1−
φ)/(1+ φ) < 1.
Equation (18) has a natural empirical counterpart, that is a linear share equation for
a panel of industries (denoted i) and years (t), formulated as the following regression
equation:
λ∗it = β1 + β2θit + eit.
In the shares equation, β2 corresponds fairly closely to the way it is used in the Davis and
Weinstein (1999, 2003a) levels equation. Here, however, it can be related directly to the
underlying parameters of the model, trade costs and the elasticity of substitution between
varieties. Head and Ries (2001) first estimate φit for three-digit manufacturing industries
in North America.19 They use the median industry to obtain an idea of what βˆ2 one should
expect in light of the observed freeness of trade. The median φ in their data is 0.07 and
the Helpman-Krugman case predicts a βˆ2 = 1.15. Under perfect competition and national
product differentiation, βˆ2 = 0.87. Panel data vary along “between” (cross-industry in
this case) and “within” (over time) dimensions. Head and Ries (2001) investigate each
dimension separately estimating a between regression corresponding to
λ¯∗i = β1 + β2θ¯i + e¯i,
18For a derivation and comparison see Head et al. (2002).
19Actually Head and Ries (2001) calculate 1/φij ≥ 1 along the lines the trade freeness computations in
section 3.1 of this paper.
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and a within specification given by
(λ∗it − λ¯∗i ) = β1 + β2(θit − θ¯i) + (eit − e¯i).
The variables under bars are the six-year averages for the corresponding industry. Be-
tween and within results for the share equation are strikingly different. Using the share of
shipments as the proxy for λ∗, the between estimate of β2 is 1.13. With a standard error
of 0.07, this result provides some support for the hypothesis that North American man-
ufacturing exhibits “on-average” home market effects. The impact of demand is slightly
smaller than the already small value predicted by the calculated φˆit. The within dimension
of the data, which allows each industry to have its own fixed effect, reveals a βˆ2 of 0.84.
One way to read these results is supportive of the home market effect. This read-
ing emphasizes the between results and dismisses the within results with the argument
that six years is not long enough for the magnification effect to manifest itself. Alterna-
tively, a skeptic would critique the between specification, pointing out that fairly small
correlations between omitted determinants of comparative advantage and the demand
shares could deliver a spuriously high coefficient on demand. The within specification’s
industry-specific fixed effects might be interpreted as controls for comparative advantage.
That specification has a standard error (RMSE) that is less than a fifth of the standard error
of the between specification.
To resolve this impasse, Head and Ries (2001) offer a third, “tie-breaking” specification
in which they relate changes in production shares to changes in trade barriers interacted
with the initial share of demand. In both short and long-run versions of the Krugman
(1980) model, higher tariffs are more helpful the lower is the home country’s level of de-
mand. In the data, however, tariff protection offers greater benefits to relatively large
demand industries. That is, when Canada-US border costs declined, the low demand
industries in Canada fared better than their high demand counterparts. This result is con-
sistent with a constant returns model of the manufacturing sector in which varieties are
differentiated according to the nation of production.
6.2 The impact of “home biased” demand
Trionfetti (2001) also employs a specification based on Helpman and Krugman (1985). He
introduces a novel means of discriminating between the increasing returns and compara-
tive advantage hypotheses: The impact of “home biased” demand. Trionfetti (2001) shows
that, in the increasing returns, monopolistic competition framework, for a given share of
demand from all sources (θ), a country with a higher share of customers that “buy do-
mestic” will tend to have a higher share of the firms in the industry. Trionfetti (2001)’s
specification can be expressed (in terms of the notation we have already been using) as
λ∗i = β1 + β2θi + β3HBi + ei.
The new variable HBi measures the share of the “home-biased” demand in industry i re-
siding in the home-country. The coefficient on HBi should be positive if and only if the
increasing returns monopolistic competition model applies. The magnification effect, β2,
from prior specifications need not be greater than one in the presence of increasing returns
and home bias. The key issue is not the mere existence of home-biased demand. Any sym-
metric avoidance of foreign varieties is observationally equivalent to a common non-tariff
barrier. In the Helpman and Krugman (1985) model such symmetric home bias lowers φ
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and thereforeM as well. The Trionfetti (2001) specification relies upon one country hav-
ing more home biased customers than the other. If that is the case, firms would not simply
follow demand to be close to the larger market. This might put them into a position of hav-
ing to reach home-biased customers by exporting to them which is not profitable. Rather,
firms will care about locating near customers in general but particularly near those who
refuse to buy non-local goods. Asymmetric home bias is like an asymmetric tariff. The
larger is the tariff on imports holding the tariff on exports constant, the more the incen-
tive to locate in the protected market. Thus, Trionfetti (2001) is relying on the “import
protection as export promotion” feature of increasing returns models.
Like Davis and Weinstein (2003a), Trionfetti (2001) estimates using cross-country vari-
ation in demand and production to identify coefficients at the industry level. His sample
comprises eight European countries and he identifies home biased demand using input-
output tables for those countries isolating for each industry the sources of demand for
which the import share is below average or twice below average. Trionfetti (2001)’s re-
sults offer mixed support for the home market effect. The magnification effect, β2, is never
significantly greater than one and often significantly less than one. The home-bias effect
β3 is positive and significant for 7 out of 18 industries.
Bru¨lhart and Trionfetti (2002) propose a similar test based on a different estimate of
home biased demand. They proceed in two steps, first estimating a gravity trade equation
where, in the spirit of Wei (1996), flows internal to countries are added and identified by a
dummy. The exponential of the coefficient on this dummy gives the extent to which coun-
tries trade “excessively with themselves,” which is identified with the home bias. With
such an estimate for each industry of each importing country, they can construct an IDIO-
BIAS variable on the samemodel as the IDIODEM variable (capturing deviations from the
median home bias in the sample) from Davis and Weinstein (1999, 2003a) papers and run
the same type of regressions as Davis and Weinstein with this new variable added.20 The
hypothesis tested is very similar to the above: Models of trade characterized by increas-
ing returns and home bias should exhibit a positive coefficient on the IDIOBIAS variable
as opposed to models of comparative advantages. Their sample comes from the OECD
COMTAP database and the HME regressions concerns 6 countries (Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Netherlands, UK), 18 manufacturing industries and 4 years (1970, 1975, 1980
and 1985). Five out of the 18 industries exhibit a response to home biased demand and
therefore validate the discriminating test in favor of increasing returns. Those industries
(Office machinery, Motor Vehicles, Meat products, Dairy products, Paper and Printing)
taken together represent around a quarter of manufacturing output of the zone.
6.3 The magnification of exports
As stated in the very beginning of this section, the original formulation of the home mar-
ket effect by Krugman (1980) focused on the impact of market size on net exports of a
country in IRS industries. In a two region framework, this “trade version” of the home
market effect states that the region with a share of demand for the IRS good superior to
one half will be a net exporter of this good. This prediction, as with the one on production
shares seen in the above subsections, extends to other (though not all) popular imperfect
competition models with trade costs (Head et al., 2002). Lundba¨ck and Torstensson (1998)
20Note that the 2001 paper by Trionfetti follows a share regression specification which has a closer link to
theory than the Davis and Weinstein (1999, 2003a) type of regression adopted in the later paper.
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implement this prediction empirically for 17 OECD countries over 49 industries (using the
STAN database). Their version of the theoretical setup includes possibly different home
biased preferences across countries and, as in Trionfetti (2001), this yields an additional
HME prediction. In this setup, a country will produce disproportionately and be a net ex-
porter of the goods for which the home bias of its customers is most pronounced compared
to its trade partners. The empirical specification links the net trade in industry/country
combinations to a measure of “demand bias” (intended to capture how demand in a coun-
try deviates from the sample’s average demand for the considered industry), and a mea-
sure of home bias. This last variable is given by the residuals from a first stage regression
of domestic producers market share of domestic demand on their market share of world
demand for each industry. The regressions also include three more variables, two for fac-
tor endowments and one for scale economies. Results are again mixed for the HME: The
demand bias variable is positive and significant in 6 out of 17 countries, significantly neg-
ative in 3 countries, and insignificant for the 8 remaining countries. The variable intended
as a proxy for home bias asymmetries in preferences offers much greater support, being
very significantly positive in all countries.
Three recent papers—Feenstra, et al. (2001), Weder (forthcoming), and Hanson and
Xiang (2002)—propose tests for the HME using bilateral export patterns. Feenstra et al.
(2001) estimate gravity equations and interpret a larger coefficient on exporter GNP than
importer GNP as evidence of the home market effect. They find this coefficient pattern
in differentiated products but not for homogeneous products. Weder (forthcoming) finds
that the ratio of UK to US exports to third markets are increasing in the relative size of
the UK market. It is not clear, however, whether this result violates a model of national
product differentiation and constant returns if the latter allows larger countries to produce
(and export) a larger number of varieties. Hanson and Xiang (2002) adopt a different
definition of homemarket effects fromwhat has been standard in the theory and empirical
literature. This makes their results difficult to compare with those of prior studies. One
important finding of this paper is that demand measures based only on national demand
give quite different results from summations of proximate demand subject to a distance
discount. The latter approach corresponds to the concept of nominal market potential
defined earlier in this chapter and also utilized in Davis and Weinstein (2003a).
6.4 The robustness of the relationship
We have summarized the methods and results of ten papers that test for the home market
effects (HMEs) implied by increasing returns models using the relationship between pro-
duction, exports, and home demand. The evidence on HMEs accumulated by these papers is
highly mixed. One can see some support for HMEs in some industries in some specifica-
tions. However reverse HMEs (coefficients on demand of less than one or on home biased
demand of less than zero) are more frequent. These overall unsupportive results should
be contrasted with the more robust results arising from wage equations seen in section 4.
The empirical success of wage equations and the less successful attempts to validate home
market effects in production regressions are entirely consistent with each other. They can
be interpreted in a positive way as a sign that market access mechanisms of NEG are em-
pirically important, but generally take the form of higher factor incomes in large demand
areas rather than magnified production shares of IRS industries.
Despite its robustness to alternate market structures and demand formulations, the
home market effect turns out to be quite fragile in one key respect. The theoretical litera-
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Figure 2: Home market effects with imperfectly elastic labor supply.
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ture following Helpman and Krugman (1985) makes assumptions that lead to a perfectly
elastic supply of labor to the increasing returns sector. This is necessary to obtain the linear
share equation. In contrast, the literature on income-access effects may be seen as holding
quantity constant and letting wages adjust. The more general case where market access
influences the number of firms in a location, and thereby net exports, as well as the pre-
vailing wage is much more difficult to carry out. However, Fujita et al. (1999) provide
an illuminating investigation, that when pushed a little bit further, yields a result that can
help to make sense of the results of the two empirical literatures.
Start from a symmetric equilibrium. Then totally differentiate, linearize and make
substitutions. The result, as shown in Fujita et al. (1999), is[
σ
1+ φ
1− φ + (1− σ)
1− φ
1+ φ
]
dw
w
+
[
1+ φ
1− φ
]
dL
L
=
dY
Y
. (19)
The supply of labour to the modern sector, L, has a wage elasticity of
η ≡ dL/L
dw/w
.
Since, around the symmetry point, firms have all the same employment, we can write
dn/n = dL/L. Finally around the point of symmetry, dλ∗/dθ = dn/ndY/Y . Thus we can
combine all these substitutions and re-express equation (19) as
dλ∗/dθ = M/(1+ (1+ (M2 − 1)σ)/η). (20)
As η → ∞ we obtain dλ∗/dθ = M = (1+ φ)/(1− φ) > 1. However, smaller elasticities of
labour supply lead to bigger wages in the large market and this dampens or even destroys
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the home market effect. This can be seen by letting the trade costs get very large. When
φ → 0, we obtain dλ∗/dθ = 1/(1+ 1/η) < 1 ; as long as η is of finite (positive) value, there
always exists a level of trade costs above which we obtain reverse HMEs. We illustrate in
Figure 2, where dλ∗/dθ is graphed against τ for different values of the labour supply elas-
ticity. It can be seen in this Figure that large trade impediments associated with low labour
supply elasticities will yield reverse home market effects (slopes inferior to one). Further-
more the monotonically decreasing relationship between the HME and trade barriers (that
we refer to as “secondary magnification”) is only valid in the limit when η → ∞.
We conclude that market access is an important determinant of both the locations of
producers and their factor returns. However, the prediction of a more than one-for-one
response of production to demand only arises under extreme versions of more general
models. Since less than unitary responses are consistent with constant returns models,
the HME test is not ideal for discriminating between increasing returns and traditional
models. While consistently larger than one estimates of the HME would have militated
in favor of an increasing returns model, the highly mixed pattern of estimated coefficients
neither supports nor falsifies the new trade foundations of NEG.
7 Trade-induced Agglomeration
The work reviewed in sections 4, 5, and 6 all consider the impact of the geographic distri-
bution of demand as an explanatory variable. While this empirical approach is useful and
justifiable in certain contexts, it is also problematic. The key idea of NEG is that the location
of demand is jointly determined with the location of production. In particular, the opportunity
to export at low cost to immobile sources of demand allows all the mobile consumers
and producers to congregate in the so-called manufacturing core. The predicted relation-
ship between the free-ness of trade and agglomeration motivated the title of this chapter.
Indeed, a large part of European academic interest in agglomeration stems from the ques-
tion of whether a more united European market will lead to more spatially concentrated
industry.
We begin this section with a review of work that has examined the relationship be-
tween agglomeration and trade costs, as well as the related issues of plant-level increasing
returns and demand mobility. Existing work of this type is loosely related to the underly-
ing theory. Later in this section, we consider steps that might be taken to treat the theory
more seriously and review two papers that move in this direction.
7.1 Concentration regressions
The papers we present in this section may be thought of as reduced-form approaches to
the hypotheses expressed verbally above. They construct concentration indexes to mea-
sure the strength of agglomeration forces over different industries and time periods, and
then check whether those patterns are broadly consistent with predictions of NEG mod-
els or with other plausible stories. All papers reviewed here can be grouped as doing the
following type of regression:
CONCs = a+ bTRCOSTSs + cIRSs + dLINKAGESs + . . .+ es.
The dependent variable, CONCs is the particular geographic concentration index of in-
dustry s. TRCOSTSs and IRSs are proxies for trade costs (τ in the model) and the degree of
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increasing returns (1/σ in the model) respectively. LINKAGESs measures the industry’s
reliance on intermediate inputs sometimes distinguishing between those that are mobile
versus those that are tied to immobile natural resources. A variety of other variables (rep-
resented above as . . .) can be added to this type of regressions, some intended alternative
explanations for agglomeration such as endowments or technological spillovers.
7.1.1 Concentration indexes of agglomeration
Measuring spatial concentration of activity is a far less trivial exercise that might seem
at first sight. Duranton and Overman (2002) list five properties we would expect from a
meaningful concentration index. Combes and Overman add four additional desiderata in
their chapter in this Handbook. Most indexes are constructed by dividing up geographic
space into regions and comparing the share of activity (measured by number of firms,
production, or employment) in each region with a benchmark. Two problems deserve
special attention. The first is that an industry with a small number of establishments may
appear to be concentrated purely by chance. This so-called lumpiness problem makes it
problematic to compare industries with commonly used measures such as the locational
Gini index. Ellison and Glaeser’s (1997) solution to the lumpiness problem has led to wide
adoption of their index, hereafter referred to as the EG index.
A second important issue that still awaits a satisfactory solution is the dependence of
concentration indexes on the level and method of geographical disaggregation. When ge-
ographic units lack economic relevance, actual clusters of industries that take place across
borders of those units are artificially separated. Furthermore, standard concentration in-
dexes fail to account for the spatial proximity of those units. A concrete example illustrates
these problems. In 1995, 76 establishments produced watches in France, employing 5406
people. The first de´partement for this industry hosted 45 of those firms, accounting for
64% of national employment of the industry (against approximately 1% of France’s GDP
and area). This extreme concentration pattern would be partly captured by Gini or EG
indexes, and it is indeed, as this industry appears to have among the highest EG index
in Table 1 of Maurel and Se´dillot (1999), who use very comparable data. One thing those
indexes miss is that the considered de´partment is Doubs, which is contiguous to Switzer-
land. It is therefore quite likely that the real agglomeration in the watch industry spills
over the political border, a feature this type of index cannot account for. In addition, the
two following de´partements in terms of the number of firms for the watch industry are
Haute-Savoie and Jura (7.1% and 3.3% of industry’s employment respectively), which are
also contiguous to Switzerland and very close to Doubs. The EG index cannot control
for this additional dimension of agglomeration, as its computation would be exactly the
same if Haute-Savoie and Jura were located hundreds of kilometers apart and away from
Doubs.
Duranton and Overman (2002) construct a “continuous-space concentration index”
that alleviates the problems associated with standard indexes. Their index uses the ac-
tual location of firms at the most detailed level available and compares bilateral distances
between all pairs of firms to a counterfactual distribution emerging from a random re-
location of all firms. There are two practical problems that will limit adoption of this
method. First, only a few data sets provide the precise address of each producing es-
tablishment. Second, the use of simulations to construct the benchmark raises issues of
replicability.
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Is the picture of relative spatial agglomeration of industries actually different when
using different indexes? Duranton and Overman (2002) calculate (in addition to their
own index) EG indexes using 120 postcodes in the UK as geographical units. The most
interesting result of the comparison for our purpose is that the two measures of agglom-
eration are almost uncorrelated when considering rankings of industries. The correlation
between the two rankings improves significantly when only large plants are considered,
but still the Spearman rank correlation between the two indexes is only equal to 0.4. This
means that the results given by a discrete space index and a continuous space index might
be very different. This should draw our attention to the fact that the spatial scale is very
important in results using the EG index. In particular, taking a level of location units that
is “too fine” can lead to an underestimation of agglomeration levels because it artificially
separates clusters that sprawl over the border between units. Even worse, the ranking of
industries can be radically changed by the choice of units, which endangers any attempt
to explain different concentration levels across industries. This important problem is also ap-
parent in Rosenthal and Strange (2001) who calculate EG indexes at the state, county and
zip code level for 4-Digit industries in the United States. The mean EG index goes from
0.0485 at the state level to 0.0101 at the Zip code level. The correlation between the two
being only 0.58.21 Rosenthal and Strange (2001) interpret this as a possible change in de-
terminants across geographical levels, but the inadequacy of the EG index to deal properly
with spatial aggregation problems is another plausible explanation.
7.1.2 Results of concentration regressions
All users of concentration indexes acknowledge that multiple phenomena (endowments,
spillovers, andNEG-type linkages for instance)—usually considered separately in theory—
probably act simultaneously in a great number of industries. High values of indexes per
se are therefore not very informative on the prevalence of NEG mechanisms in the econ-
omy. What needs to be done is to disentangle the share of each possible explanation in the
observed concentration index. We now consider papers that have related concentration in-
dexes to proxies of trade costs, increasing returns, and vertical linkages while controlling
for other possible sources of agglomeration.
Since trade costs have tended to decline over time due to improvements in transport
technology, and—since the end of WWII—due to reductions in trade barriers, a crude
strategy is to measure how spatial concentration has changed over time. Kim (1995) ex-
amines the period from 1860 to 1987. Concentration, measured by a locational Gini index,
falls until 1900, then rises to a peak around 1927 and then declines steadily until 1987,
reaching a level approximately a third lower than in 1860. This non-monotonic evolution
of concentration presents a puzzle for the basic Krugman (1991a) model. Examining Euro-
pean data from 1972 to 1996, Bru¨lhart (2001) finds that the average employment Gini index
grows by about 18%. Interestingly, there is no evidence that the growth rate accelerates
in the sub-period following the signing the Single Market Programme. In fact, contrary
to the fears of increased agglomeration with trade liberalization, the average growth rate
is about one third lower after 1986. These results are interesting but their interpretation as
evidence for or against NEG relies upon the untenable assumption that trade costs are the
only variable changing over time.
21Maurel and Se´dillot (1999) also found that the average EG index rises with the level of spatial aggregation
(from 0.06 for the 95 French de´partements to 0.09 for the 22 French re´gions. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) found
their index to have a median value of 0.005 at the US county level and 0.023 at the state level.
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A more direct approach is to relate industry-level spatial concentration to industry-
level proxies for trade costs. Bru¨lhart (2001) relates variation in the Gini indexes across
industries and over time the Buigues et al. (1990) classification of industries as character-
ized by high, medium or low NTBs. Seemingly contradictory with the basic predictions of
NEG models, concentration is positively related to NTB level. Haaland et al. (1999) find
no effect for the same NTB measure. Given the crude nature (one year, low informative-
ness about the level of protection) of the Buigues et al. (1990) measure, we should not infer
much from these inconsistent results.
Ades and Glaeser (1995) provide more persuasive results using a substantially differ-
ent methodology. Their data comprises a cross-section of 85 countries. Instead of con-
centration indexes, their dependent variable is the log of the size of the country’s largest
city. As they control for the population of the rest of the country, this is like measuring
the share of the population in the main city. Three variables capture transport costs within
each country. The first is area. Holding population constant, larger areas amount to greater
average distances between buyers and sellers, and therefore larger transport costs (lower
φ). The second and third variables measure transportation infrastructure, using, respec-
tively expenditures on transport and communication and road density. All three variables
point to a positive relation between trade costs and agglomeration (in the main city). This
contradicts the prediction of Krugman (1991a) but is consistent with the Helpman (1998)
model that reverses the relationship between agglomeration and trade costs.
Kim (1995) is one of the first papers to investigate empirically the relative explanatory
power of alternative theoretical frameworks in a panel data setting. Kim (1995) regresses
Gini indexes calculated in 1880, 1914, 1947, 1967, and 1987 for twenty 2-digit industries on
a proxy for internal scale economies (production workers per plant), a resource intensity
variable (cost of rawmaterials divided by value added), and two sets of industry and year
fixed effects. The significant positive influence of scale economies offers some support for
NEG.
Using national data from Europe, several papers have attempted to corroborate Kim’s
(1995) finding of a positive relationship between spatial concentration and measures of
scale economies. Amiti (1999) follows Kim (1995) in using firm size as the proxy for in-
creasing returns and in controlling for industry fixed effects. Her work suggests that Eu-
ropean industries also exhibit a positive correlation between changes in increasing returns
and changes in spatial concentration. Bru¨lhart and Torstensson (1996) find a 0.69 rank cor-
relation between locational Gini indexes and returns to scale estimates of Pratten (1988)
in a cross-section of 18 industries. They also find a 0.63 correlation between the degree
of increasing returns and a “centre-periphery bias” variable that the authors constructed
by relating each industry’s geographic distribution of employment to the corresponding
distribution of market potential. Thus it appears that increasing returns industries are
both spatially concentrated and centrally located. Moving beyond simple correlations and
adding a 25 year temporal dimension to the concentration data, Bru¨lhart (2001) finds how-
ever no significant effect for the Pratten measure of increasing returns. Haaland et al.
(1999) find that their scale economies proxy has a consistently negative impact on concen-
tration.
Trade costs and increasing returns are the two key parameters determining agglom-
eration in the Krugman (1991a) version of NEG. The Venables (1996) version focuses on
input-output linkages between industries. In the Puga (1999) model, this corresponds to a
parameter we call α in equation (21). Ellison and Glaeser (1997) establish a relationship be-
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tween a variant of their index capturing co-agglomeration and the input-output linkages
between the considered industry pairs. They construct two lists of 100 industries pairs,
one consisting of the 100 downstream industries that receive the largest value of inputs
per dollar value of output from a single upstream industry. The second list consists of the
100 upstream industries selling the largest portion of their output to a single industry. Out
of the first (downstream) list of industry pairs, 77 industry pairs show a tendency to co-
agglomerate, whereas the figure is 68 for the second list. Rosenthal and Strange (2001) use
manufactured inputs per dollar of shipments as a proxy for the strength of input-output
linkages in the industry (what they call “input sharing”). They find weak empirical evi-
dence of such linkages, with statistical significance only at the state level (the significance
is slightly improved when considering “young firms” that have less than 5 years of exis-
tence). Using a similar measure, Amiti (1999) finds significant positive effects of linkages
on spatial concentration in Europe. In Haaland et al.’s (1999) paper, input-output linkages
always have a small and barely significant coefficient.
What is the take-away from the concentration regressions relating spatial concentra-
tion to proxies for the key NEG parameters? First, there is little persuasive evidence that
the degree of increasing returns raises spatial concentration. Whether the absence of a
statistical relationship reflects poor proxies for increasing returns or inadequate concen-
tration indexes or the absence of an economic relationship is uncertain. Second, vertical
linkages do seem to have a fairly robust relationship with concentration. We would hope
that future work would follow the approach of Ellison and Glaeser (1997) in exploiting the
precise nature of input-output linkages, rather than just summing over all intermediate in-
put purchases. Last, trade costs have a highly mixed impact on geographic concentration.
As will be discussed in the following section, this is not inconsistent with some versions
of NEG theory. Greater concern over functional form is warranted here, as well as better
measures of trade costs. Somewhat surprisingly to us, the most convincing evidence—
provided by Ades and Glaeser (1995)—militates in favor of the Helpman (1998) model.
7.2 Taking NEG theory seriously
The models described in the previous subsection do not take NEG theory “too seriously.”
Bru¨lhart (2001), for example, explains his goal is to “..look for stylized facts that might
or might not be consistent with theoretical predictions rather than for rigorous tests of
competing models.” We think this approach is quite understandable for first-generation
empirical assessments of NEG theories. Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to take a closer
look at the predictions of NEG.
7.2.1 Concentration predictions of NEG models
Consider first the simplest NEG model, namely the Krugman (1991a) model and its con-
ditional concentration prediction often illustrated with the “tomahawk” subcritical bifur-
cation diagram. We present an example of this diagram in panel (a) of Figure 3 which
replicates the version presented as Figure 5.4 in Fujita et al. (1999) (drawn for µ = 0.4
and σ = 5). Three equilibrium configurations for the share of firms λ are associated with
a gradual fall in trade costs from an initially high level: Stable dispersion only, followed
by a multiple equilibria range where both dispersion and agglomeration are possible out-
comes, and last stable agglomeration only, for high levels of trade integration. Location
adjustment dynamics towards stable equilibria are indicated by the arrows.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium configurations in the Krugman (1991a) model.
0
0.5
1
1 1.5 2 2.5trade cost: τ 
λ
}negative shock 
τB
τS
co
n
st
an
t e
la
sti
ci
ty
 o
f s
ub
sti
tu
tio
n:
 σ
Agglomeration
Dispersion
Agglomeration or Dispersion
Industry 2 
in 1980
Industry 2
in 2000
Industry 1 in 2000
Industry 1 in 1980
2
4
6
8
10
1 1.5 2 2.5trade cost: τ 
(a) Bifurcation for µ = 0.4 and σ = 5 (b) Bifurcation for µ = 0.4 and varying σ
Inspection of this diagram reveals that there are indeed predictions on concentration
variation, but those are at the same time too simple to be verified and not simple enough
to be easily implemented empirically. The basic prediction is that for levels of trade costs
above the sustain point (τS), only dispersion can be an equilibrium, while under the break
point (τB), only full agglomeration can be sustained as a stable equilibrium. While this
simplest prediction of an abrupt and immediate change from complete symmetry to ex-
treme agglomeration is clearly too stark to be verified, the pattern suggests a positive rela-
tionship between trade integration and concentration, which is the rationale behind much
of the empirical work reviewed in section 7.1.2. Note that this prediction can in principle
be subjected to empirical test using time series (focused on the evolution of concentration
indexes within each industry) or cross section data (focused on assessing which industries
are correctly predicted to be dispersed of agglomerated).
There are however important issues in the implementation of such tests. Indeed, a key
concern is that this model predicts nothing like a simple linear relationship between con-
centration and trade integration. In fact, it is immediately apparent from the diagram that
for the vast majority of admissible parameter values, “nothing will happen” in terms of
concentration after a small fall in trade costs τ. It is only somewhere between τS and τB
that a considered industry will discontinuously jump from the symmetric to the agglom-
erated equilibrium. This prediction, sometimes referred to as catastrophic agglomeration,
is summarized in the following quote:
Catastrophe is the most celebrated hallmark of the CP model—probably be-
cause it is so unexpected. Specifically, starting from a symmetric outcome and
very high trade costs, marginal increases in the level of trade free-ness φ has
no impact on the location of industry until a critical level of φ is reached. Even
a tiny increase in φ beyond this point causes a catastrophic agglomeration of
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industry in the sense that the only stable outcome is that of full agglomeration.
[Baldwin et al. (2003)]
A linear regression is therefore severelymis-specified as even if there existed an industry
where the simplest NEGmodel applied perfectly, the linear estimation would presumably
yield a coefficient not statistically different from zero, which would likely be misinter-
preted as a rejection of NEG. The expectations that should be derived from this theory
are truly more complicated than a simple linear relationship and heavily dependent on
the values of the parameters. The vast empirical literature (covered above and in much
more depth in Combes and Overman chapter of this Handbook) trying to find evidence of
NEG through linear relationships with concentration indexes as the dependent variable is
therefore weakly grounded in theory (while being often both insightful and instructive).
Our belief is that time has come for this type of research to now re-consider their method-
ological strategy and in particular think about ways to improve the specifications with a
closer concern about what the models actually predict.
There are however several possible empirical implementations of the simple NEG
model more consistent with theory. The bifurcation diagram can again be used here, in
a version accounting for the likely variance across industries in both τ and σ dimensions.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 uses the same sustain and break point equations to divide the σ-τ
parameter space into ranges where (i) full agglomeration in one location or the other are the
only stable equilibria, (ii) symmetric dispersion is the only stable equilibrium, and (iii) the
shaded area in which agglomerated and dispersed equilibria are stable. This representa-
tion can be seen as a graphical version of Table 5.1 in Fujita et al. (1999).
Several empirical implementations seem possible when considering the (b) panel of
Figure 3. Industry-level estimates of τ and σ can be used to give coordinates for each
industry to be placed in the Figure for a given set of trade partners. Measuring these
parameters is not a trivial task, of course. Ideally, τ should capture a variety of sources
of trade costs including transport costs, tariffs, non-tariff barriers, communication costs.
Those costs are bilateral in nature (depending for instance on bilateral distance between
the trading partners) and industry-specific (transport costs of concrete and semiconductor
chips differ drastically).22
Measuring σ raises difficult issues because this parameter fulfills multiple roles in the
Dixit-Stiglitz model. It is not only a differentiation parameter, but also the price elasticity
of demand, an inverse index of scale economies, and an inverse measure of equilibrium
markups. Using a gravity equation, coefficients on the origin country price term or on
bilateral tariffs or freight can then be used to infer σ.23 Alternatively, one can exploit the
fact that the Lerner index in the Dixit-Stiglitz model is given by (p− c)/p = 1/σ, with p
denoting price and cmarginal cost. Consequently, multiplying by the output of symmetric
firms in the industry, one can calculate σ at the industry level as shipments/(shipments-
variable costs).24
With estimates of τ and σ in hand, the next step is to assess whether a cross section
of industry-level concentration indexes match the predictions of the model (for instance,
22Hummels (1999) and Limao and Venables (2001) are two papers that grapple with the issue of measuring
international transport costs correctly.
23For details on several variants of this method, see Hummels (1999), Head and Mayer (2000), Head and
Ries (2001), Lai and Trefler (2002), and Erkel-Rousse and Mirza (2002).
24In other market structures, such as Ottaviano et al. (2002), this simple relationship between markups and
the substitution parameter does not exist.
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that industry 1 was more agglomerated than industry 2 in 1980 as predicted by the model
illustrated in Figure 3). One may also look within industries to verify whether changes in
parameters over time delivered the predicted change in agglomeration patterns. In the
examples considered in Figure 3, concentration indexes can be used to assess whether
industry 1 became more dispersed over the period and industry 2 more agglomerated.
7.2.2 The diagonal Puga model
The Krugman (1991a) model is however probably too restrictive to be used directly in em-
pirical work following the lines just mentioned. Indeed, a particularly important feature
of this model is that it predicts that high trade costs will generate dispersion and low trade
costs agglomeration. The problem with this is that the Krugman (1991a) model continues
to predict full agglomeration even as transport costs become tiny. This is because the dis-
persive forces decline with trade costs at an even more rapid rate than the agglomerative
forces. With any other congestion force unrelated to trade costs, the equilibrium pattern of loca-
tion will return to dispersion for some (low) trade costs threshold where all trade-related
forces become so weak that they must be dominated by the congestion force.25 These
additional congestion forces cause dispersion to have a U-shaped relationship with trade
costs. Reciprocally, spatial concentration has what Ottaviano and Thisse in this Handbook
describe as a bell-shaped relationship with trade costs.26
Linear regressions of concentration indexes on trade costs remain inappropriate in the
Puga (1999) model. The good point of the bell shape prediction in terms of empirical test-
ing and specification is that there is at least a continuous relationship between trade costs
and concentration over some range of the parameters. Unfortunately, this relationship is
not linear and worse, not monotonic.
The Puga (1999) version of the NEG model removes the exotic dynamics of the Krug-
man (1991a) model while remaining analytically tractable. It is sufficiently detailed and
complete to nest the Krugman (1991a) and Krugman and Venables (1995) approaches. To
extend the Puga (1999) model to accommodate multiple increasing returns industries, we
do have to impose a strong assumption about the input-output structure: Firms in an
industry source all their intermediate inputs from their own industry. This implies a diag-
onal input-output (I-O) structure. We also must assume that industry expenditure shares
are fixed by preferences (i.e. the upper level utility is Cobb-Douglas). Those assumptions
are restrictive, beingmore acceptable as approximations only for highly aggregated indus-
tries. This suggests the need for more detailed modelling of actual input-output linkages
and demand substitution patterns between industries (as detailed below, this is an impor-
tant contribution of Forslid et al., 2002 to provide predictions of a “full” model with I-O
linkages between 14 industries calibrated on real data).
The parameters of interest include τ (trade costs), σ (the elasticity of substitution be-
tween varieties), µ (the share of consumer expenditure on manufactured goods), α (the
25Examples of congestion forces giving rise to the bell shape include Helpman (1998), where the housing
sector makes agglomeration unsustainable for very low trade costs, or comparative advantage as in Forslid
andWooton (forthcoming). TheOttaviano and Thisse chapter also analyzesmechanisms yielding the bell. The
bell-shaped prediction can be obtained through the inclusion in the NEG model of different realistic features
such as impediments in inter-regional workers’ mobility (Krugman and Venables, 1995, enriched considerably
in Puga, 1999) or heterogeneity in the tastes of workers which translates into their migration patterns (Tabuchi
and Thisse, 2002).
26Describing the bell as an “inverted U” is both awkward and potentially confusing and should therefore
be avoided.
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share of costs constituted by purchases of intermediate goods from one’s own industry,
which is zero in the Krugman (1991a) model), and η, (the elasticity of a region’s labor sup-
ply to the manufacturing sector with respect to local agricultural wages, which Krugman
(1991a) and Krugman and Venables (1995) assume to be infinite).
We therefore implement the analysis presented in Puga (1999), where he identifies the
threshold transaction costs between which dispersion is unstable and we should there-
fore expect to observe agglomeration. This analysis is intended to illustrate what this
unexplored path of empirical implementation of NEG theory could be. Let us follow his
notation and define φ
s
and φs as the lower and upper break points for sector s. Puga (1999)
shows that these break points are solutions to the following quadratic equation in φ:
[σ(1+ α)− 1][(1+ α)(1+ η) + (1− α)µ)]φ2
−2{[σ(1+ α2)− 1](1+ η)− σ(1− α)[2(σ− 1)− µα]}φ
+(1− α)[σ(1− α)− 1](η + 1− µ) = 0. (21)
The roots of this equation give the degrees of trade freeness φ
s
above which complete
symmetry is unstable and activity starts to agglomerate, and φs for which trade is so easy
that the process of re-dispersion is completed and the equilibrium reverts to perfect sym-
metry. Although the analytical expressions of solutions to equation (21) are not easy to
manipulate, they can be calculated very easily for each sector s when one plugs in values
of parameters of main interest, σs, µs and αs. This gives for each industry the range de-
fined by [φ
s
, φs] over which agglomeration is expected and that we can compare with φˆs
calculated from observed trade flows of country pairs representative of ongoing regional
integration (namely USA-Canada and Germany-France) following equation (4) (see the
appendix for a complete description of sources of parameters and data). The results for all
industries are represented in Figure 4.
Horizontal solid lines (sorted by midpoint) show the range, for each industry, over
which symmetric equilibria are unstable in Puga (1999), and therefore agglomeration is
expected. Industries without solid lines had undefined break points (no real roots ex-
isted for their values of parameters).27 Dots (•) for France-Germany and triangles (4) for
Canada-US show estimated φˆ using 1995 trade and production data gathered fromWorld
Bank and OECD sources.
Therefore, we can first identify, with the position of the φˆ symbols, the industries that
are predicted to be in a symmetric equilibrium and the ones that are predicted to be in
an agglomerated equilibrium for the two integrating regions. Furthermore, among those
industries predicted to be dispersed, we can in theory draw a clear distinction between
the industries for which the trade integration level is so low that they did not even enter
the agglomeration zone yet, and those for which the integration process is so advanced
that they are already out of the agglomeration zone. Note that this first very rough em-
pirical implementation of the Puga (1999) model predicts most of the industries to be near
the lower end of the agglomeration range, where more trade integration will yield more
agglomeration. Those break points calculations can be quite sensitive to chosen parame-
ters values, which pleads for cautious interpretations of the results. More experimentation
with different sets and sources of key parameters is in this respect clearly needed to check
the robustness of those predictions.
27Inspection reveals that, for those five industries, equation (21) is positive for all values of 0 < φ < 1. This
corresponds to local stability of the symmetric equilibrium for all admissible values of φ.
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Figure 4: “Where in the bell are we?”
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Can these results be related to observed agglomeration of the considered industries in
order to check if theoretical predictions arising from Figure 4 match with real data? Re-
turning back to the bell shape curve of Puga’s (1999) Figure 6, we can first relate a measure
of concentration of the industry to its position on the bell curve. This is however maybe
taking the theory “too seriously.” In the actual data, it is for instance highly unlikely that
we would observe some industries to be totally dispersed and some totally agglomerated.
A perhaps more sensible test of those predictions would be to try to fit a bell-shaped func-
tion to the data. Thus we might relate a geographic concentration index of industry s,
CONCs, to a bell-shaped function, f (·), of the gap between actual free-ness of trade and
the midpoint of the two breakpoints:
CONCs = f (φˆs − [φs + φs]/2) + es,
where f (·) peaks at f (0). This equation could also be estimated using time-series data
instead of a cross-section of industries.
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7.2.3 Simulations of higher dimension models
NEG theory mostly deals with the case of two locations, two industries, and two factors.
This simplifies models in which it is already difficult to obtain analytical results. It is there-
fore quite difficult to envision what the theoretical predictions would be in a framework
of a higher order dimension. Nevertheless, we have to confront higher dimensional data
in almost any sensible empirical verification of the theory. This is especially important as
it is well known from traditional trade theory and new trade theory that 2× 2× 2 model
predictions often do not have simple counterparts when expanding the dimensions of the
model. Forslid et al. (2002) present a simulation exercise where a large scale computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model is calibrated on EU data using various 1992 external
sources for parameters. The aim is to obtain “numeric intuition” of higher order proper-
ties of those models.
Also important for empirical implementation is to depart from the assumption that
countries “are all alike.” One of the important goals of the NEG literature was to show that
agglomeration could arise endogenously, starting from a situation of perfectly symmetric
countries or regions. This mirrored the effort of new trade theories a decade before to
design models able to generate (intra-industry) trade in a world of seemingly identical
countries in terms of endowments and technology. In empirical work, natural advantages
have to be brought back in the analysis, because in the real world countries differ in their
initial conditions in ways that can be expected to alter the final outcome.
A quite important point is that traditional comparative advantage constant returns
with perfect competition models also give rise to predictions of increasing agglomera-
tion accompanying trade liberalization. The increased specialization of countries in the
production of the goods for which they have a comparative advantage will indeed trans-
late into increased agglomeration of industries across space. However this relationship
is predicted to be monotonic as opposed to the NEG models of the increasing returns
with imperfect competition type outlined above, where the bell shape emerges. Forslid
et al. (2002) provide a framework encompassing both input-output linkages in a Venables
(1996) type model and comparative advantage patterns in order to assess which industries
are predicted to exhibit the bell shape and which industries are predicted to agglomerate
monotonically with trade integration. There are 14 industries linked with region-specific
input-output tables (the regions are groupings of 17 West European countries into 4 Eu-
ropean regions called Central, North, South and West). Of those 14 industries, ten are
assumed to have the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman usual market structure, two are traded per-
fectly competitive sectors without trade costs and with decreasing returns to scale, and
two are nontradable monopolistic competition services sectors. Capital, unskilled labour
and skilled labour—the three primary factors of production—are assumed to be interna-
tionally immobile. Data for calculating parameters mostly comes from Eurostat, GTAP
and NBER world trade flows databases. The parameters of primary interest, trade costs
and elasticities of substitution, respectively come from GTAP and from scale elasticities
calculation based on Pratten (1988).
The main result of interest for our purpose lies in Forslid et al. (2002)’s Figure 3, which
depicts the path of the agglomeration of each industry (as measured by the standard de-
viation of the distribution of the share of production of the industry in each region) with
respect to trade costs. Metals, chemicals, transport equipment and machinery all exhibit a
distinct bell shape in the agglomeration index with decreasing trade costs, while the other
increasing returns industries in their model (and specially so textile, leather, and food
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products) show a monotonic increase in agglomeration. The bell-shaped industries show,
as expected, the highest degree of increasing returns to scale and relatively high share of
own output in their intermediate goods consumption. We can also note from this paper
that those industries are predicted to be at the start of the agglomeration process; that is,
in the beginning of the range of trade costs for which agglomeration increases with trade
liberalization. Note however that the amount of predicted changes in the concentration patterns
is much lower in the bell-shaped industries than in the others that seem to follow more closely the
predictions from comparative advantage theories. Thus, while the theoretical interest is pri-
marily focused on those industries, it might be that the major part of the action concerning
spatial distribution of activities in Europe will take place in more traditional industries
exhibiting considerably larger concentration trends. This pattern is also observed in some
of the papers investigating concentration patterns in a more descriptive way (like the ones
covered in section 7.1.2).
Combes and Lafourcade (2001) also propose simulations based on a model featuring
input-output linkages between imperfectly competitive industries operating in a multiple
location space. Their modeling strategy however differs notably from the usual approach
as they use a Cournot, segmented markets, homogenous goods model as their theoretical
framework. The paper proceeds in two steps: A structural estimation of the model is fol-
lowed by a simulation of transport costs reduction effects. The estimated equation relates
employment per firm in each of the 341 French regions considered to two terms capturing
final demand and input-output linkages. The econometric analysis involves estimation
for each industry of the sole unobserved element in the model: Industry-specific transport
costs (a parameter for each industry multiplying an observed average transport costs).
If this parameter is insignificant, the industry is estimated to be unaffected by transport
costs and the linkages at the heart of agglomeration in this model are irrelevant. Signif-
icant and positive parameters are interpreted as empirical validation of the model. The
results exhibit 47 significantly positive coefficients out of 64 industries in the full version
of the model.
The second step use the transport cost sensitivity estimates to simulate the effects of a
uniform transport cost decrease in France (up to 30%). For computational reasons, simula-
tions have to be run for the short-run version of the model (keeping the number of plants
in each location-industry at its actual level in 1993). The change in production patterns
and extent of agglomeration therefore entirely arises from changes in prices and individ-
ual production by firms (both of which would be unchanged in a Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman
framework).
The simulation results show a fall in production concentration for all industries. How-
ever, spatial scale matters. At the national level, the authors offer the stark prediction of
a gradual switch from a monocentric structure to a duocentric one, the area around Lyon
emerging as a second important center more comparable to the area around Paris. Mean-
while, at a finer geographic scale, increased polarization of activity around the main cities
of France arises from the simulations. The overall picture is therefore one of an increased
number of large centers of more even size, with surrounding areas loosing their industrial
base to the benefit of the local center.
Those last papers seem to correspond to the kind of “computable spatial equilibrium”
work that Fujita et al. (1999) called for in the conclusion of their book. They use ambitious
NEG theoretical modelling, extended to account for important characteristics such as pre-
cise input-output linkages between a great number of industries, in order to give insights
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of what those models predict when a particular experiment, such as a drop in trade costs,
occurs. In that sense they bear a large inheritance from modern computable general equi-
librium modelling of trade liberalization accounting for market structure imperfections.
This kind of work can be viewed, as Forslid et al. (2002) nicely put it, as “theory with
numbers, rather than empirical results.” These papers show how to generate empirical
predictions that are tightly linked to rich versions of underlying theory. The next step
would be to find cases where reality has conducted the same type of experiment as the
simulation. Then one can confront predictions from calibrated models with actual data on
concentration indexes to assess the empirical validity of predictions that are tightly linked
to theory.
8 Instability, Persistence, and Agglomeration
The existence ofmultiple equilibria, only some of which are stable, is a very general feature
of the NEG framework. Evidence of multiple equilibria in economic geography would
not directly support the NEG approach since human capital and technological externali-
ties also generate the self-reinforcing processes that create multiple equilibria. However,
evidence refuting multiple equilibria would support the “natural advantages” approach
in which agglomerations occur where they do because of exogenous and unchanging fea-
tures of the natural setting.
Davis and Weinstein (2002) recently examined Japanese history and devised several
tests designed to detect multiple equilibria. Their results, summarized in the quote below,
clearly indicates that the authors do not find a lot of support for the existence of multiple
equilibria.
“An important practical question, then, is whether such spatial catastrophes
are theoretical curiosa or a central tendency in the data. Our results provide
an unambiguous answer: Even nuclear bombs have little effect on relative city
sizes over the course of a couple of decades. The theoretical possibility of spa-
tial catastrophes due to temporary shocks is not a central tendency borne out
in the data.” Davis and Weinstein (2002) (p. 1284 emphasis is in the original)
The basic question is whether the geographic pattern of agglomeration is stable over
time periods featuring large shocks. Natural advantages models should exhibit such sta-
bility since there is a single equilibrium, which is globally stable and should change slowly
given that nature changes slowly. In contrast, NEG models—and others of similar ilk—
might exhibit instability. Referring back to the panel (a) of Figure 3, suppose the economy
has parameter values that situate it in the region of three stable equilibria. Then a mod-
erate negative shock to an agglomeration (that is a decline in λ from a starting point of
λ = 1, as illustrated with a “}”) could move the economy past the dashed line to a region
of the parameter space where the dynamics (shown by the arrows) now push towards
the symmetric dispersed equilibrium. Thus, while a small shock would rapidly be re-
versed (agglomeration is locally stable), a moderate shock could cause the agglomeration
to unravel. An extremely large shock could even reposition the agglomeration from one
location to another.
There are two related statistical methods for examining the issues of persistence and
responsiveness to shocks. First, one can simply look at the correlations between the size
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of current agglomerations and their size in the past. Second we can estimate the extent to
which locations recover from measured shocks.
8.1 Stability of historical location rankings
The long-run correlation method calculates the raw or rank correlation between city i’s
current share of the relevant population, λit, and its share b years before, λi,t−b. While a
high correlation is expected for small b, it seems likely that over a longer period, featuring
general population increase, important economic transitions and shocks, the correlation
would decline dramatically. In calculating λit one may use cities as the geographic unit as
long as they are consistently defined over time. Lacking such data, Davis and Weinstein
(2002) use 39 regions for which they divide regional population by regional area and ob-
tain population density as the agglomeration measure. The most striking result from the
intertemporal correlations is that 1998 population density has a 0.76 raw correlation with
population density in 1600 (i.e. b = 398); at 0.83, the rank correlation is even higher. Thus,
over a four century period in which the total population of Japan increased tenfold, the
economy shifted from agriculture to manufacturing and services, the ranking of regions
remained remarkably stable.
Brakman et al. (2002) investigate stability of city sizes in Germany. Unlike Japan,
where mountainous terrain substantially constrains where its 126 million residents might
live, Germany’s physical geography exerts a less dominant influence. For 60 cities, the
authors find a a 0.841 rank correlation between their 1939 and 1999 populations. Since
Davis andWeinstein (2002) find 0.93 rank correlation between 1920 and 1998, this suggests
that Germany’s agglomeration pattern is somewhat less persistent than Japan’s.
One of the main messages of Davis and Weinstein (2002) is that physical geography
matters a great deal for economic geography. They quote from recent theoretical mono-
graphs to establish that NEG theorists have given inadequate attention to the importance
of physical geography in explaining agglomeration. Another set of researchers, most no-
tably Jeffrey Sachs (2001) and Jared Diamond (1997), have been pushing a “geography as
destiny” viewpoint. Acemoglu et al. (2002) illustrate one case where early geographic ad-
vantages translated into subsequent disadvantages. Their experiment is the European colo-
nization of much of the Americas, Africa, and Oceania following 1500. One might expect,
under some models of NEG, that Europeans would colonize areas that already provided
good markets and supplies of inputs. In that case, we might expect colonizers to choose
areas that already had relatively dense and urbanized populations. In a natural advan-
tages setting, one would expect Europeans to choose the areas with strong fundamentals,
which again would probably be the areas of relatively dense inhabitation.
Acemoglu et al. (2002) also argue that the urbanized areas were very likely to be the
more prosperous areas based on both theory and current cross-sectional correlations be-
tween urbanization and income per capita. They raise the question of whether prosperity
in 1500 would be a good forecaster of prosperity in 1995. The answer they find is a re-
sounding no. Incomes in 1995 are negatively related to both urbanization and population
density in 1500. The currently prosperous countries tend to be ones that attracted Euro-
pean colonists who brought with them European institutions. The Europeans tended to
treat existing population centers as locations to extract resources from and this resulted,
according to Acemoglu et al. (2002) in investment-depressing institutions. While this
study has only a tangential connection to NEG empirics, we think it worth mentioning
to elaborate on the type of historically focussed empirical work that might help to disen-
43
tangle the different roles of natural advantages, self-reinforcing processes, and shocks in
determining the pattern of agglomeration.
Dumais et al. (2002), following up on Ellison and Glaeser (1997), study the evolution
of the EG concentration index over the period 1972–1992. One of the objectives of Dumais
et al. (2002) is to investigate the pattern of industry mobility to assess “how important
historical accidents are in practice and whether Krugman’s charming examples are repre-
sentative.” An important preliminary finding is that the measured level of agglomeration
of industries is very stable over time: They find a correlation coefficient of 0.92 between
1972 and 1992 EG indexes across industries (Kim, 1995, finds a corresponding striking
correlation of 0.64 with a different localisation index between 1860 and 1987 values).
As emphasized by the authors, this dynamic stability is compatible with different, and
informative, patterns of underlying “firms demographics.” One possible pattern is that, in
each industry, new firms replace old or dead ones in the same locations. Another possibil-
ity is that the underlying economic forces in each industry persist over time and therefore
yield this great stability in the levels of agglomeration, despite important changes in the
precise location of the industry. NEGmodels are often characterized by historical accidents,
in which a region taking an accidental lead in the production share of the IRS industry
might end up attracting all firms of this industry. The linkages creating the agglomeration
forces thereafter make it very difficult to “break the core” into a more dispersed pattern
or relocate this core in another region. Concentrated industries because of NEG linkages
should therefore be expected to be very immobile over time.
Contrary to those NEG-type expectations, Dumais et al. (2002) find that the most ge-
ographically concentrated industries do not exhibit any less mobility than a typical un-
concentrated industry. This result therefore sheds some doubt on the hypothesis that spa-
tial concentration would be mainly explained by mechanisms locking-in industries in the
locations historically chosen by pioneering firms.
8.2 The long-term impact of temporary shocks
The long-run correlations are interesting especially when we have strong reason to believe
that there were important city-specific shocks that might have impacted agglomeration
patterns. It is more compelling to examine these city-specific shocks directly using the
shock persistence regressions. Assuming multiplicative shocks, taking natural logs, and
calculating before and after differences, one obtains
(lnλi,t+a − lnλit) = α+ β(lnλit − lnλi,t−b) + eit, (22)
where a is the time elapsed after the split point (t) and b is the time elapsed before the split.
Thus, b is the duration of the period in which the shock occurs. The estimated value of β
tells us about the dynamics. An estimate of βˆ ≈ 0 suggests a random walk in city sizes.
That is all shocks have permanent effects. On the other hand, βˆ ≈ −1 suggests shocks
undo themselves over the time frame of a years.
For Davis and Weinstein (2002), the shock period is 1940 to 1947 (i.e. b = 7) when
Japan experienced intense bombing from Allied forces that devastated many cities. The
shock recovery period is 1947 to 1960 (i.e. a = 13). While their motivating algebra is in
terms of the log shares, they replace the difference in log shares with the growth rates in
their regressions. While these will be approximately the same for small changes, we think
it advisable to retain the difference-in-logs specification for contexts such as their study
where there were large changes.
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Note, that it can be shown that if the three values of lnλi (t + a, t, and t − b) were
completely independent of each other (say just random noise) then the expected coefficient
on β would be −0.5. This is because λit enters negatively in the dependent variable and
positively in the explanatory variable. To deal with simultaneity, Davis and Weinstein
(2002) instrument for λit − λi,t−b using city-specific death and destruction measures.
Davis and Weinstein (2002) estimates βˆ ≈ −1. Thus, cities experiencing the largest
population declines due to bombing tend to have the fastest postwar growth rates. By
1960, on average the population shocks have been fully reversed. Even Nagasaki and Hi-
roshima, victims of atomic bombs that reduced populations by 8.5% and 20% respectively,
saw their populations come back in line with their 1925–1940 growth trends as early as
1960 for Nagasaki and 1975 for Hiroshima.
Those fascinating, albeit macabre, results exhibit no evidence for the catastrophe phe-
nomena that are possible in NEG models. However, the distance from theory of this
work commands some caution in interpretation: How large should the shock be for the
model to predict a change in equilibrium? One should probably employ a simulated ver-
sion of the model to examine this question. An additional difficulty is that the size of
the shock needed depends on the level of integration of the zone. As shown in the left
panel of Figure 3, the region of high sensitivity to shocks is only for a narrow range of τ
(1.627 < τ < 1.807 for the case considered in Figure 3). Outside that range, two situations
are possible: When τ is very high, symmetry cannot be broken, whatever the size of the shock.
When the actual τ is lower than the bottom of the range, much larger shocks would be re-
quired to reverse the pattern of agglomeration. Indeed, the Davis and Weinstein (2002)
paper is unclear as to whether they assume Japan in that period to be in the zone where
both symmetric and agglomerated equilibria coexist or in the zone where there is no sta-
ble dispersed equilibrium. The two cases have different implications: In the former, the
equilibrium can jump from agglomerated to dispersed (or the reverse) with a relatively
small shock compared with the shock needed in the latter situation to make the equilib-
rium switch from agglomeration in one region to agglomeration in another. Therefore, it
is at least possible that Japan was at the time in a parameters zone where only a reversal of
agglomerated equilibrium was possible, a switch that could only result from shocks even
larger than nuclear bombing. Further empirical investigation of NEG-type persistence of
temporary shocks needs to take into account that the predictions of those models are con-
ditional on values of the parameters. This recommendation parallels the one made above
about concentration index regressions.
Another caveat regarding inferences to be drawn from Davis and Weinstein’s (2002)
study is that this is a case where physical geography matters an exceptional amount.
Japan’s mountainous topography, with a small share of overall land actually suitable for
large scale city locations, makes it possible that activity reverts to its original location be-
cause there is no other suitable location left to occupy. While this point might certainly
have some validity for activity and population growth as a whole, it should have less
importance at the industry level. This is investigated in a follow-up paper by Davis and
Weinstein (2003b). In the aftermath of allied bombing on Japanese cities, they show a
tendency for specific industries to locate back where they initially were (despite massive de-
struction that drastically changed the distribution of industries across cities). This finding
further undermines the case for multiple equilibria in location patterns.
Brakman et al. (2002) study the impact of wartime bombing in Germany. With respect
to the persistence of related shocks, they find an estimate of β equal to −0.42 for West
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German cities when they assume a = 4. This goes to −0.52 when the authors broaden
the “after” window to 17 years. They use house destruction as their instrumental variable
for the population shock. Oddly, in East Germany, there was no tendency towards shock
reversal and urban populations appear to follow random walks. We see a value to more
studies of shock persistence. From these two studies, it is tempting to conclude that the
greater the constraint imposed by physical geography, the greater will be the tendency for
shocks to undo themselves over time.
Combining the key results of this section, it seems that this set of recent papers shows
no evidence of either catastrophes (city sizes persist despite large shocks) or historical acci-
dents (same level of mobility between concentrated and dispersed industries). It suggests
that those two celebrated characteristics of NEG models should perhaps be considered
more as fascinating theoretical “exotica” rather than as robust elements of economic geog-
raphy.
9 Conclusion
Theoretical work on economic geography has a long and productive history. The last
decade has seen a torrent of new papers, many of which expand upon the framework de-
veloped by Krugman (1991a). This literature, often referred to by the not very descriptive
title of “new economic geography”, is exciting because it generates results that contrast
markedly with the traditional analyses involving exogenous factor supplies and constant
returns to scale. NEG theories are characterized by magnification, bifurcation, multiple
equilibria, and the possibility of catastrophe.
At its conclusion, the authors of The Spatial Economy argued that a vital part of “the
way forward” from their work would involve empirical examination of the “intriguing
possibilities” raised by the new theory. They did not specify the form these examinations
should take, nor has any consensus emerged on the empirical methods to be applied to
NEG.
Although the theory is still being digested, a large new serving of empirical work has
arrived over the last five years. This survey has attempted to organize the new empirics of
agglomeration and trade into categories and then assess the collective support it provides
for NEG. The diversity in approaches that characterizes this literature probably stems in
large part from the difficulties inherent in testing theories involving circular causation. In
terms of the results, our sense is that the dust has not settled yet. One can see a number of
supportive findings but there are just as many findings that appear to undermine the new
theory. The positive relation betweenwages andmarket potential looks like a sturdy result
but the response of production to demand, while certainly positive, is not consistently
greater than one for one. Economic activity concentrates spatially but this agglomeration
cannot yet be seen as confirmation of the theories that were constructed to explain the
phenomenon. There are a number of other explanations that are consistent with the data
and not much yet that strongly points to the explanation offered by NEG.
The lesson to be learned from past work (and from Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995) is
that methods need to be designed to connect closely to the theory but should not be reliant
upon features of models that were included for tractability or clarity of exposition instead
of realism. Rather we need to focus on testing the essential distinguishing features of the
models that allow one to falsify them or their alternatives.
What elements of the existing empirical literature will and should continue to figure
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prominently in future empirics? First, trade costs are a critical parameter and further work
will continue to try to estimate how they vary across industries and over time. In models
based on CES demand, it is critical to identify the free-ness of trade which is a compound
parameter, τ1−σ, depending on trade costs as moderated by the elasticity of substitution
between varieties. Second, the concept of real market potential (demands that are summed
up while discounting for distance, borders, and supply alternatives) should continue to
figure in studies of the location decisions of firms and workers, as well as the determina-
tion of factor prices. More work will be required to decide how to estimate each location’s
real market potential. In addition we need tests to discriminate between market potential
as a motive for agglomeration in contrast to other mechanisms that might generate similar
empirical relationships. Indeed, while structural estimation of NEG models is a valuable
approach, we believe the biggest advances will come from approaches like David andWe-
instein’s (1996, 2003) where estimates of a single parameter can allow us to choose between
plausible alternative mechanisms of economic geography.
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A Data appendix of Figure 4
Figure 4 uses several data sets that make feasible an industry-level collection of parameters
values combined with trade freeness calculation. The main issue is to find a sufficiently
flexible industry classification that allows both for a reasonable level of detail in the study
and good data availability. The classification used by the OECD for its IO tables is quite
attractive in those respects as it has a very easy correspondence with UN industry classifi-
cations ISIC rev2 and rev3, which are widely used and are quite easy to match with trade
data.
The parameters needed are µ (the share of the industry’s good in overall consump-
tion), α (the share of own industry inputs expenditures in overall costs) and σ (which has
the many interpretations emphasized above). For this graph, we use the OECD IO table
for Japan in 1990 which is the latest table available. µs is calculated as the share of domestic
demand for industry s goods in total domestic demand (domestic demand being defined
as private final consumption + government purchases plus purchases for investment of
goods from industry s). α represents the share of inputs purchased from own industry in
overall costs (proxied by total purchases on intermediates plus compensation of employ-
ees). σs is taken from Table 4 of Hummels (1999) which gives estimates for 2 digit SITC
rev3 industries in 1992, easy to match with the IO classification (the average of σ values
are taken when multiple SITC goods categories map into a single IO industry). The last
parameter needed to compute the range defined by [φ
s
, φs] is η, fixed to 200. More work is
needed on getting estimates of η from the literature and ensuring that real roots exist for
lower, more realistic, values.
The calculation of φˆs involves comparable bilateral trade and production data in a com-
mon classification for our country pairs. The trade data from the World Bank trade and
production database and production figures extracted from STAN OECD database both
map into IO industries and give data for a quite long time period. For Figure 4, we use
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Table 5: Values of parameters used in Figure 4
IO code Description µ α σ φfr−de φus−ca
3 foodbevtob 6.78% 18.52% 4.53 0.033 0.034
4 cloth 2.34% 34.66% 6.62 0.088 0.055
5 wood 0.36% 20.38% 3.64 0.019 0.130
6 paper 0.53% 36.61% 4.34 0.035 0.112
7 chemical 0.49% 42.93% 3.89 0.138 0.202
8 drugs 0.43% 7.56% 9.53 0.051 0.044
9 petro 0.72% 6.77% 5.01 0.019 0.055
10 plastics 0.26% 22.55% 5.36 0.070 0.135
11 minerals 0.10% 15.10% 2.65 0.032 0.087
12 ferrous 0.00% 58.59% 2.32 0.098 0.095
13 non-ferrous 0.04% 49.19% 6.66 0.150 0.343
14 fabmetal 0.49% 7.49% 4.85 0.024 0.061
15 machinery 3.83% 22.61% 7.87 0.106 0.494
16 computers 1.50% 19.38% 11.02 0.543 0.807
17 electrical 1.71% 19.30% 5.88 0.078 0.262
18 radiotvcom 1.89% 32.94% 9.44 0.212 0.210
19 ships 0.16% 0.12% 7.40 0.012 0.107
20 railroad 0.31% 21.01% 7.40 0.052 0.185
21 vehicles 2.67% 49.08% 7.11 0.130 0.594
22 aircraft 0.22% 39.63% 7.40 0.812 0.207
23 instruments 0.59% 17.80% 7.43 0.100 .
1995 data to evaluate freeness of trade (except for aircraft, for which we use 1996 for the
France-Germany φ), a recent year that is not too remote from the years for which parame-
ters µ, α and σ are available.
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